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467 
Note 
 
Recognizing Transgender, Intersex, and 
Nonbinary People in Healthcare 
Antidiscrimination Law 
Derek Waller 
“What are you?”  
— A physician to a transgender patient.1 
 
“THE DIAGNOSIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PATIENT’S 
GENDER.” 
— An insurer’s reason for rejecting a transgender patient’s 
claim.2 
 
“Affirmative care means treating trans people like people . . . it’s not 
that hard.” 
— From an interview with Afton Bradley, Program Manager for 
Transgender Health at Planned Parenthood in Richmond, 
Virginia.3 
 
*** 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like 
to thank several people for their generous support as I wrote this Note. Thanks 
to Professor Amy Monahan for serving as my advisor and providing me detailed 
and helpful feedback, Professor Jessica Clarke for helping me develop this topic 
and introducing me to antidiscrimination law, and Professor Kristin Hickman 
for a helpful discussion about statutory interpretation. Additionally, thanks to 
Trevor Matthews and Franklin Guenther in the Note & Comment Department 
for their extensive feedback on many drafts and to the staff and editors of the 
Minnesota Law Review for their editing contributions. Copyright © 2018 by 
Derek Waller. 
 1. Neda Ulaby, Health Care System Fails Many Transgender Americans, 
NPR (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/11/21/ 
564817975/health-care-system-fails-many-transgender-americans. 
 2. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 
WL 1197415, at *18 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015). 
 3. Ulaby, supra note 1 (paraphrasing an interview with Afton Bradley). 
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  INTRODUCTION   
Transgender people frequently experience discrimination by 
healthcare providers and insurers. Providers discriminate by 
treating transgender patients differently than cisgender4 pa-
tients. They have treated transgender patients with hostility, re-
fused to provide treatment, and failed to meet their unique 
health needs.5 Insurers, both private and public, discriminate by 
refusing to pay for transgender patients’ healthcare and denying 
them access to medically necessary care.6 These types of discrim-
inatory practices prevent transgender people from accessing the 
care they need to have healthy and productive lives. 
Reports from transgender people indicate that anti-
transgender discrimination in healthcare is widespread. In the 
2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, the largest and most comprehen-
sive survey of transgender people ever conducted,7 transgender 
respondents reported that they experience discrimination at 
alarming rates. Fifty-five percent of survey respondents who 
 
 4. “Cisgender” refers to a person whose gender identity corresponds to her 
sex assigned at birth. See Cisgender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cisgender. 
 5. See, e.g., SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L. CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER 
EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 10 (2016), 
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17 
.pdf [hereinafter 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY]; Suresh Bada Math & Shekhar 
P. Seshadri, The Invisible Ones: Sexual Minorities, 137 INDIAN J. MED. RES. 4, 
4–5 (2013). 
 6. 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 95 (reporting transgender 
respondents experienced issues with insurance coverage for care related to both 
gender transitioning and general reproductive health). 
 7. The survey relied on self-reported data from 27,715 respondents and is 
the largest survey of transgender people in the United States. 2015 
TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 4. A recent poll by NPR, the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, and the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health 
supports these findings and suggests that the data has not changed significantly 
since 2015. See Joe Neel, Poll: Majority of LGBTQ Americans Report Harass-
ment, Violence Based on Identity, NPR (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/ 
2017/11/21/565327959/poll-majority-of-lgbtq-americans-report-harassment 
-violence-based-on-identity. 
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sought insurance coverage for a gender-affirming—i.e., transi-
tion-related—procedure8 had their claims denied.9 Of those re-
spondents who received coverage for a gender-affirming proce-
dure, twenty-one percent could not find an in-network provider 
who offered the procedure.10 Twenty-five percent of respondents 
who sought coverage for gender-affirming hormone therapy had 
their claims denied.11 Thirteen percent of respondents who 
sought coverage for so-called “sex-specific” routine medical care, 
such as a cervical cancer screening, had their claims denied.12 
One-third of respondents reported one or more negative experi-
ences with a medical provider in the last year.13 Nearly one-
fourth of respondents avoided seeking healthcare they needed 
because they feared being mistreated.14 
While facing significant barriers to care, transgender people 
also experience unique and significant health needs.15 Thirty-
nine percent of transgender people surveyed reported currently 
experiencing serious psychological distress, compared with five 
percent of the overall U.S. population.16 Nearly half of survey 
respondents reported serious thoughts of suicide in the past 
year, and seven percent of respondents had attempted suicide in 
the past year, which is nearly twelve times the rate of suicide in 
the general U.S. population.17 
These negative health outcomes are preventable. 
Transgender people who receive gender-affirming services re-
port significantly lower rates of psychological distress.18 For 
transgender people who successfully transition with support,19 
 
 8. Gender-affirming procedures are services that align a person’s physio-
logical anatomy with their gender identity. These services are also commonly 
referred to as transition-related care. See FENWAY HEALTH, GLOSSARY OF GEN-
DER AND TRANSGENDER TERMS 4 (2010), http://fenwayhealth.org/documents/ 
the-fenway-institute/handouts/Handout_7-C_Glossary_of_Gender_and_ 
Transgender_Terms__fi.pdf. 
 9. 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 95. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 97. 
 14. Id. at 98. 
 15. Id. at 93. 
 16. Id. at 106. 
 17. Id. at 112–13. 
 18. Id. at 107. 
 19. Contrary to a popular misconception, many transgender people choose 
not to pursue genital surgical interventions. People have different goals for their 
gender expression, but those are often met through enhancing the masculiniza-
tion or feminization of their appearance. Additionally, genital surgeries are not 
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the vast majority experience an improved quality of life.20 Gen-
der-affirming services not only improve the quality of life for 
transgender people, they can help to ensure they have a life to 
enjoy. As a transgender health manager noted, receiving gender-
affirming care leads to a dramatic reduction in suicide at-
tempts.21 One respondent to the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey 
reported: 
I have struggled with depression and anxiety ever since puberty. I’ve 
failed classes, isolated myself, and considered suicide because of this. 
A year ago, I felt hopeless and had daily suicidal thoughts, and today 
I’ve got a plan for the future and haven’t had a serious suicidal thought 
in months. I firmly believe this is because of my transition. I feel so 
much more comfortable and happy than I’ve ever been.22 
Many transgender activists echo this experience: access to gen-
der-affirming health services can dramatically improve health 
outcomes.23 However, the discrimination transgender people ex-
perience prevents them from accessing health services.24 Reduc-
ing discrimination can therefore improve health outcomes for 
transgender people. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)25 pro-
vides an opportunity to reduce the discrimination experienced by 
transgender people26 and other sexual minorities.27 It contains 
 
recommended for all transgender people due to personal preferences or poten-
tial medical risks. See Dean Spade et al., Medicaid Policy & Gender-Confirming 
Healthcare for Trans People: An Interview with Advocates, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 497, 497–98 (2010). 
 20. See Tim C. van de Grift et al., Surgical Satisfaction, Quality of Life, and 
Their Association After Gender-Affirming Surgery: A Follow-Up Study, 44 J. 
SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 138, 139 (2018) (finding transgender individuals re-
ported an increased quality of life after receiving surgery to align their physical 
anatomy with their gender identity). 
 21. Ulaby, supra note 1. 
 22. 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 106. 
 23. See Spade et al., supra note 19, at 498–99 (describing negative health 
consequences faced by trans people who do not receive gender-affirming care, 
including mental health issues and HIV, and the incarceration of trans people 
who may break the law in order to obtain the healthcare services they need). 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 499–500 (showing how the elimination of Medicaid cov-
erage for transgender people creates a discriminatory barrier of access to health 
services). 
 25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, 260 (2010). 
 26. Although “lawsuits will not eliminate health disparities,” private rights 
of action are an important mechanism that allow individuals to defend their 
right to live without experiencing discrimination. See DANIEL E. DAWES, 150 
YEARS OF OBAMACARE 222 (2016) (quoting William H. Frist, Overcoming Dis-
parities in U.S. Health Care, 24 HEALTH AFF. 445, 447 (2005)). 
 27. This Note will use “sexual minorities” as a shorthand for transgender, 
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an antidiscrimination provision, Section 1557, that prohibits 
healthcare providers and insurers from discriminating on the 
basis of sex.28 However, it does not expressly refer to transgender 
people.29 Although some federal courts have found that the stat-
ute prohibits discrimination against transgender people, some 
have reached the opposite conclusion.30 Courts and administra-
tive agencies dispute whether the word “sex” applies to the types 
of discrimination experienced by transgender people.31 Because 
the statute contains no definition of sex, courts must engage in 
statutory interpretation to determine whether the phrase “on 
the basis of sex”32 applies to sexual minorities.33 
This Note proposes a solution to that problem by presenting 
an interpretation of the ACA that would prohibit discrimination 
against transgender, intersex, and nonbinary people.34 By con-
sidering contemporary scientific understandings of sex charac-
teristics and classification, this Note argues that “on the basis of 
sex” in Section 1557 refers to discrimination due to any of the 
various traits that determine a person’s biological sex, including 
gender identity. Courts have misinterpreted Section 1557 by re-
lying on assumptions about gender and sexuality to define sex 
 
intersex, and nonbinary people. However, this terminology is imperfect because 
the term “sexual minorities” is typically also used to refer to lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual people. See, e.g., Valerie K. Blake, Remedying Stigma-Driven Health 
Disparities in Sexual Minorities, 17 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 183, 184 
(2017); Math & Seshadri, supra note 5, at 4 (“Usually, [s]exual minorities com-
prise of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals.”). 
 28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 
(2012). 
 29. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 260 (2010). 
 30. Compare Prescott v. Rady Children’s Hosp., 265 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 
1098–99 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (finding that the ACA protects transgender individu-
als from discrimination), and Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037 
(SRN/FLN), 2015 WL 1197415, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (deferring to the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) after finding transgender 
protections in the ACA’s non-discrimination provision ambiguous), with Fran-
ciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 687 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (holding 
that the ACA unambiguously excludes transgender people from its non-discrim-
ination provision). 
 31. Compare Prescott, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1099 (“[S]ex under Title VII en-
compasses both sex . . . and gender.”) (internal quotation omitted), with Fran-
ciscan All., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 687–89 (understanding “sex” to exclude gender 
identity). 
 32. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
 33. See, e.g., Franciscan All., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 687–89 (engaging in stat-
utory interpretation to define “sex”). 
 34. For definitions about each of these identities, see infra Part I.A. 
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discrimination.35 This Note provides a framework that courts 
can use to reach a more accurate statutory definition of sex in 
Section 1557 by considering contemporary medical science about 
sex and gender. By using principles of statutory interpretation 
to interpret sex in a manner that recognizes transgender, inter-
sex, and nonbinary identities, this Note offers litigants and 
courts a new way to understand sex discrimination in healthcare 
antidiscrimination law.36 As transgender rights attorney M. Dru 
Levasseur has argued,37 the key to progress on transgender 
rights is to persuade courts “to gain a clear understanding of who 
transgender people are using the latest medical science.”38 This 
 
 35. See Franciscan All., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 687–89 (finding sex indicates a 
binary definition and excludes gender identity). 
 36. By providing a framework for courts to properly interpret the text of 
Section 1557, this Note diverges from the strategies proposed by other student 
scholars who have argued for amendments to the ACA or regulations to recog-
nize transgender identities. See, e.g., John E. Farmer, Note, Charting the Mid-
dle Course: An Argument for Robust but Well-Tailored Health Care Discrimina-
tion Protection for the Transgender Community, 52 GA. L. REV. 225, 231–32 
(2017) (arguing for a statutory change to the ACA to protect transgender peo-
ple); Sarah E. Gage, Note, The Transgender Eligibility Gap: How the ACA Fails 
to Cover Medically Necessary Treatment for Transgender Individuals and How 
HHS Can Fix It, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 530–33 (2015) (arguing that the ACA 
failed to provide protections for transgender people and that HHS should im-
plement regulations requiring insurers to cover transgender-specific health ser-
vices); Rachel C. Kurzweil, Note, “Justice Is What Love Looks Like in Public”: 
How the Affordable Care Act Falls Short on Transgender Health Care Access, 21 
WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 199, 259–60 (2014) (arguing that HHS should 
promulgate a regulation interpreting Section 1557 to prohibit gender-based dis-
crimination); see also Samuel Rosh, Note, Beyond Categorical Exclusions: Access 
to Transgender Healthcare in State Medicaid Programs, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 1, 2–3 (2017) (arguing that Medicaid laws should cover gender transi-
tion procedures and other transgender healthcare coverage). 
 37. “M. Dru Levasseur is Senior Attorney and Transgender Rights Project 
Director for Lambda Legal, the oldest and largest national legal organization 
committed to achieving full recognition of the civil rights of lesbians, gay men, 
bisexuals, transgender people and people living with HIV.” See M. Dru Le-
vasseur, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us/staff/m-dru 
-levasseur (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
 38. M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to 
Reflect Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 
943, 947 (2015). Other legal scholars have advocated for a reading of the ACA 
that protects transgender people. This Note adds to these works by providing a 
statutory interpretation of Section 1557 that protects transgender, nonbinary, 
and intersex people. See, e.g., Nina Zhang, Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act Could Expand Coverage for Gender Dysphoria, 26 HEALTH L. 26, 27–
28 (2013) (arguing the ACA’s antidiscrimination provision expands insurance 
coverage for transgender individuals); Wyatt Fore, Note, Trans/Forming 
Healthcare Law: Litigating Antidiscrimination Under the Affordable Care Act, 
28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 243, 244–48 (2017) (interpreting the ACA’s antidis-
crimination provisions to include transgender people); Liza Khan, Note, 
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Note answers this call in the context of healthcare antidiscrimi-
nation law by using medical science to recognize transgender, 
intersex, and nonbinary identities in Section 1557’s definition of 
sex. 
Healthcare law is an especially appropriate context for 
courts to consider a medically accurate definition of sex. Physi-
cians have a uniquely powerful role in determining a person’s 
sex,39 so the legal definitions of sex should reflect that medical 
reality. Further, Section 1557 should be interpreted consistently 
with the purposes of the ACA, which adopted “a series of inter-
locking reforms” designed to expand access to health services.40 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the unique history of the 
ACA requires courts to interpret its provisions to align with the 
statute’s purpose and to protect the ACA’s architecture of 
healthcare reforms.41 Defining sex discrimination in Section 
1557 in a way that protects sexual minorities increases access to 
healthcare, consistent with the goals of the ACA.42 
Part I explores how sex is defined in medical science and in 
antidiscrimination law. It concludes by comparing these defini-
tions with how courts have interpreted sex discrimination in the 
context of Section 1557. Part II critiques the approach courts 
have taken to defining sex and proposes a definition of sex dis-
crimination that applies to sexual minorities. It reaches this in-
terpretation of Section 1557 by using traditional tools of statu-
tory construction. Part III demonstrates how the definition of sex 
 
Transgender Health at the Crossroads: Legal Norms, Insurance Markets, and 
the Threat of Healthcare Reform, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 375, 
377–79 (2011) (arguing there is a gap between developments in transgender 
health and the law, which will impact interpretations of the ACA’s antidiscrim-
ination provision); Jennifer Wong, Note, Recasting Transgender-Inclusive 
Healthcare Coverage: A Comparative Institutional Approach to Transgender 
Healthcare Rights, 31 LAW & INEQ. 471, 472–73 (2013) (examining various 
health insurance options for transgender individuals to determine which com-
binations best secure access to gender transitioning procedures and care). 
 39. See Julie A. Greenberg, The Roads Less Traveled: The Problem with 
Binary Sex Categories, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 51, 52 (Currah et al. eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Greenberg 2006]. 
 40. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015). 
 41. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
519, 544–45 (2012), and King, 135 S. Ct. at 2505–06, the Supreme Court chose 
to interpret provisions of the ACA in a manner that protected Congressional 
intent. See infra Part III. 
 42. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 597 (Ginsburg, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (finding Congress enacted the ACA to increase 
individuals’ access to affordable healthcare regardless of any preexisting condi-
tions). 
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proposed in Part II furthers the purposes of the ACA. Part III 
also explains why the Supreme Court’s analysis of the ACA de-
mands interpreting the statute in a manner consistent with the 
statute’s purpose. 
I.  DEFINING SEX   
This Part summarizes current medical and legal under-
standings of sex classifications, with a focus on how intersex, 
transgender, and nonbinary traits are defined in medicine and 
in antidiscrimination law. Section A provides an overview of cur-
rent medical understandings of sex and gender. Section B con-
trasts those understandings with legal definitions of sex and 
gender in antidiscrimination law. Section C assesses how the 
ACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination in healthcare settings 
applies to sexual minorities. 
A. DEFINING SEX IN MEDICAL SCIENCE 
This Section provides an overview of the basic definitions of 
sex and gender, as understood in contemporary medical science. 
Although these understandings are not universal, the defini-
tions described herein reflect the opinions of medical experts and 
of transgender, intersex, and nonbinary people. This Section also 
provides an overview of transgender, intersex, and nonbinary 
identities with a focus on how the medical community classifies 
each identity. 
1. Sex and Gender 
Sex commonly refers to a person’s status as male, female, or 
neither because of biological factors, especially those factors re-
lating to a person’s reproductive anatomy.43 Biological sex is typ-
ically determined by a physician at birth based on an assessment 
of the newborn’s external genitalia.44 If the child has a penis of 
adequate size, i.e. one that the physician determines will even-
tually be capable of performing penetrative vaginal sex,45 the 
child is classified as male.46 In the absence of an adequate penis, 
 
 43. Greenberg 2006, supra note 39, at 52. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Despite this practice, the size of a newborn’s penis has not been reliably 
correlated with penis size later in life. ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE 
BODY 58 (2000) [hereinafter FAUSTO-STERLING 2000]. 
 46. JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MAT-
TERS 16 (2012) [hereinafter GREENBERG 2012]. 
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the child is typically classified as female.47 This practice of sex 
assignment is still prevalent among physicians.48 
In contrast to sex, gender identity refers to a person’s “in-
nermost concept of self as male, female, a blend of both or nei-
ther.”49 Gender identity can also be described as “brain sex” to 
emphasize that it is a psychological factor.50 While sex is com-
monly considered biological and objective, gender is considered 
social and inherently subjective.51 Gender identity may be the 
same as or different from a person’s biological sex characteris-
tics.52  
Biological determinants of sex in humans are far more com-
plex than common beliefs of sex and gender suggest. Medical ex-
perts consider several criteria in determining sex: “genetic or 
chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, genita-
lia, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex/gender of rear-
ing, and self-identified sex.”53 For most people, each of these fac-
tors indicates one of the binary sexes.54 However, for an 
estimated 1.7% of people, these factors do not align exclusively 
with the male or female sex.55 For some people, any one of these 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. See FAUSTO-STERLING 2000, supra note 45, at 48–50 (detailing the sex 
assignment process for infants with atypical genitals). These practices, though 
common, are not based on evidence-based science, but on heteronormative as-
sumptions about sex. See KATRINA KARKAZIS, FIXING SEX: INTERSEX, MEDICAL 
AUTHORITY, AND LIVED EXPERIENCE 138–41 (2008) (describing how genital sur-
geries performed on intersex children seek to produce genitals that reflect het-
eronormative forms of sexual desire). 
 49. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, HUM. RTS. CAM-
PAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity 
-terminology-and-definitions (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
 50. Levasseur, supra note 38, at 955 (citing Rachael Wallbank, Re Kevin In 
Perspective, 9 DEAKIN L. REV. 461, 461–62, 467, 493 (2004)). 
 51. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT 
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, GENDER IDENTITY, AND GENDER EXPRESSION 1 (2014), 
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.pdf [hereinafter AM. PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ASS’N] (“Sex is assigned at birth . . . [whereas] [g]ender refers to . . . socially 
constructed roles.”). 
 52. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, supra note 49. 
 53. Greenberg 2006, supra note 39, at 54 (citing JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS 
OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO COUNSELING CHILDREN, 
ADOLESCENTS, AND THEIR FAMILIES 4 (2d ed. 1994)). 
 54. Id. at 55. 
 55. See FAUSTO-STERLING 2000, supra note 45, at 53 tbl.3.2 (calculating 
that approximately 1.7% of all people are intersex). But see Leonard Sax, How 
Common Is Intersex? A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling, 39 J. SEX RES. 174, 
174–75 (2002) (arguing that Fausto-Sterling’s estimate is 100 times too high 
because it includes syndromes most clinicians do not define as intersex and that 
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factors may in itself be ambiguous. For example, chromosomal 
sex is typically assumed to be exclusively “XX” or “XY,” but phy-
sicians have discovered people with other combinations, “includ-
ing XXX, XXY, XXXY, XYY, XYYY, XYYYY, and XO.”56 Other 
people experience ambiguities among different sex factors.57 For 
example, androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS) is a hormonal 
syndrome that occurs when a genetic male, i.e. a person with XY 
chromosomes, cannot process androgens, which are hormones 
required to develop male sex characteristics.58 For a fetus with 
AIS, external female genitalia will form.59 Despite female geni-
talia at birth, the child will not have female reproductive or-
gans.60 
2. Intersex61 
When one of the sex determining factors is ambiguous, phy-
sicians will often diagnose an infant with a disorder of sex devel-
opment (DSD).62 For example, chromosomal sex disorders in-
clude Klinefelter and Turner syndrome;63 gonadal sex disorders 
include Swyer syndrome;64 external organ anomalies are classi-
fied as hermaphroditism.65 Ambiguities within and among the 
first six factors of biological sex define a class of people known as 
 
intersex should only describe people whose chromosomal sex is different than 
phenotypic sex or whose phenotype is not classifiable as either male or female). 
 56. Greenberg 2006, supra note 39, at 56. Despite this wide variety of var-
iation in human chromosomal make-up, many physicians now consider genetic 
chromosomes to be the essential consideration when assigning sex to newborns. 
See KARKAZIS, supra note 48, at 106. 
 57. Greenberg 2006, supra note 39, at 58–60 (listing various non-chromo-
somal ambiguous sex factors and conditions). 
 58. Id. at 59. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. For an excellent resource on legal issues faced by the intersexual com-
munity, see Pat Newcombe, Blurred Lines—Intersexuality and the Law: An An-
notated Bibliography, 109 LAW LIBR. J. 221 (2017). 
 62. See Greenberg 2006, supra note 39, at 57–61 (providing definitions for 
various disorders of sexual development). 
 63. See id. at 57–58. 
 64. Id. at 58. 
 65. Id. at 59. 
  
2018] HEALTHCARE ANTIDISCRIMINATION 477 
 
“intersex.”66 Scientists have historically struggled to classify in-
tersex conditions, but contemporary physicians are typically 
more familiar with DSDs.67 
Many intersex people experienced some form of surgical 
genital mutilation shortly after birth.68 These procedures were 
performed throughout the twentieth century in the United 
States and some surgeons still practice them.69 If a newborn’s 
external genitalia did not clearly indicate male or female sex, 
physicians would surgically alter the child’s genitalia, some-
times eliminating all sexual feeling by removing or altering gen-
ital tissue.70 The Intersex Society of North America, founded by 
intersex activist Cheryl Chase in 1993,71 sought to end pediatric 
surgeries on children with ambiguous genitalia.72 The United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights now considers “genital-
normalizing surgeries” a form of torture.73 Intersex activism has 
made these practices less common today,74 but physicians still 
 
 66. There is significant debate among intersex activists about how to define 
these various conditions. In this Note, I use the terminology approach taken by 
Julie Greenberg in INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW by referring to these condi-
tions as intersex. I prefer not to characterize intersex conditions as disorders or 
medical problems that need to be solved. However, some activists prefer the 
term disorders of sex development (DSD) and have challenged the usefulness of 
the term intersex. See GREENBERG 2012, supra note 46, at 1, 92–93. 
 67. For a historical review of scientific and medical understandings of hu-
man sex classifications, see FAUSTO-STERLING 2000, supra note 45, at 30–44. 
Professor Fausto-Sterling notes how theories of intersexuality in the nineteenth 
century fit into a set of biological ideas about differences between social groups, 
such as Jews and Gentiles, whites and non-whites, and middle-class and work-
ing-class men. Id. at 39. 
 68. See, e.g., id. at 56–57. 
 69. See, e.g., id. at 48 (stating individual surgeons make personal decisions 
about which procedures to perform). 
 70. See GREENBERG 2012, supra note 46, at 5–6. 
 71. For an overview of the history of the intersex activist movement, see 
Newcombe, supra note 61, at 252–54. 
 72. SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 138–39 (2008) (describing 
Cheryl Chase’s history and the mission of the Intersex Society of North America 
to change medical treatments for children born with ambiguous genitalia). 
 73. Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur 
on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
¶ 76, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/53 (Feb. 1, 2013) (“[G]enital-normalizing surger-
ies . . . are rarely medically necessary, can cause scarring, loss of sexual sensa-
tion, pain, incontinence and lifelong depression and have also been criticized as 
being unscientific, potentially harmful and contributing to stigma.”).  
 74. See GEORGIANN DAVIS, CONTESTING INTERSEX: THE DUBIOUS DIAGNO-
SIS 76–79 (2015) (interviewing physicians who support intersex activists in re-
sisting genital surgeries in infants); Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on 
Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS e488, e493 (2006) (noting 
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pressure parents to consent to surgical interventions on intersex 
infants.75 
3. Transgender 
People with otherwise harmonious sex determinants may 
nevertheless have an internal sense of sex that does not align 
with the other factors.76 The American Psychological Association 
classifies this condition as gender identity disorder (GID),77 and 
notes that the diagnosis is for people “who experience intense, 
persistent gender incongruence.”78 For many transgender peo-
ple, the diagnosis is stigmatizing because it pathologizes their 
identity as a mental disorder.79 On the other hand, the diagnosis 
can be a useful tool for transgender people to obtain legal recog-
nition and medical care.80 In many states, a GID diagnosis or 
other evidence of medical treatment is a prerequisite to change 
a gender identity designation on official documents, including 
birth certificates,81 driver’s licenses, and passports.82 In this 
 
that surgical interventions often lead to decreased sexual sensitivity, potential 
scarring, and other risks). 
 75. See DAVIS, supra note 74, at 82 (acknowledging pressures to consent to 
surgery). For a critique of this practice and an argument that parents cannot 
consent to genital-normalizing surgery for their intersex children, see Kishka-
Kamari Ford, Note, “First, Do No Harm”—The Fiction of Legal Parental Consent 
to Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
469 (2001). 
 76. Greenberg 2006, supra note 39, at 61. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 51, at 3. 
 79. Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra 
note 39, at 274, 275 (“To be diagnosed with gender identity disorder is to be 
found, in some way, to be ill, sick, wrong, out of order, abnormal, and to suffer 
a certain stigmatization as a consequence of the diagnosis.”). 
 80. See id. 
 81. Washington recently adopted a regulation that allows anyone born in 
the state to change the sex designation on their birth certificate without ap-
proval from a physician. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-490-075 (2018); Sex Des-
ignation Change on a Birth Certificate, WASH. ST. DEP’T HEALTH, https://www 
.doh.wa.gov/LicensesPermitsandCertificates/BirthDeathMarriageand 
Divorce/SexDesignationChangeonaBirthCertificate (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
 82. See Anna James (AJ) Neuman Wipfler, Identity Crisis: The Limitations 
of Expanding Government Recognition of Gender Identity and the Possibility of 
Genderless Identity Documents, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 491, 507–08 (2016) 
(outlining New York’s new policy allowing trans people to change sex infor-
mation on government-issued identification forms, but still requiring corrobo-
ration from a medical professional to do so). See generally Dean Spade, Docu-
menting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731 (2007–2008) (identifying practices 
required to change gender classification in identification documents, sex-segre-
gated facilities, and state Medicaid programs). 
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medical model of gender identity, a GID diagnosis is a prerequi-
site to obtaining gender-affirming procedures,83 which are inter-
ventions such as surgical or hormonal treatments that align a 
person’s physiology with their gender.84 
Gender-affirming procedures come in a variety of forms and 
only some alter any of the sex characteristics described above.85 
For example, hormone treatments and genital surgeries alter 
sex characteristics.86 Hormone therapy is the most common form 
of gender-affirming treatment because it can enhance secondary 
sex characteristics such as voice, facial hair, breast tissue, and 
muscle mass.87 Further, hormone therapy has a lower financial 
cost and entails fewer medical risks than surgery.88 Some 
transgender people receive no medical interventions related to 
their gender presentation.89 Despite the fact that most 
transgender people do not obtain genital surgeries, some states 
require proof of genital surgery in order to change legal identity 
documents.90 
 
 83. For a summary and critique of the medical model, see Dean Spade, Re-
sisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15 (2003). 
See also Franklin H. Romeo, Note, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a 
New Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
713, 718 (2005) (contrasting the medical model, which explains gender noncon-
formity as psychological condition treated with medical services, with the bio-
logical model, which explains gender as solely a product of a person’s biology).  
 84. Anne E. Silver, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Coercing Consent to Surgery 
Through the Medicalization of Gender Identity, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 488, 
500 n.59 (2014) (listing gender-confirming treatments and procedures). 
 85. See id. at 500–01; see also Spade et al., supra note 19, at 498 (providing 
examples of alternative forms of gender expression). 
 86. Spade et al., supra note 19, at 498. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. at 497. 
 90. For a critique arguing that these requirements unfairly coerce people 
into obtaining surgeries and that this coercion violates bioethical norms and 
principles, see Silver, supra note 84, at 489. See also Lisa A. Mottet, Moderniz-
ing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender Mark-
ers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives 
of Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 381–83 (surveying state 
requirements for changing gender identification on birth certificates, including 
those states that require proof of surgery). 
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4. Nonbinary 
Individuals who do not identify with a gender identity of ei-
ther male or female have a nonbinary gender identity.91 Nonbi-
nary does not refer to a third gender, but rather to the constella-
tion of genders that do not fit in the gender binary.92 These 
identities are not new,93 but have recently received official recog-
nition in some states.94 For example, California recently passed 
a law allowing a nonbinary gender option on all state documents, 
including birth certificates.95 Similarly, Washington now offers 
a third sex option on birth certificates.96 Like transgender peo-
ple, nonbinary people face discrimination in healthcare set-
tings.97 
 
 91. See Understanding Non-Binary People: How to Be Respectful and Sup-
portive, NAT’L. CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (July 9, 2016), https:// 
transequality.org/issues/resources/understanding-non-binary-people-how-to 
-be-respectful-and-supportive. 
 92. For a basic overview of nonbinary people’s identities, see id. 
 93. See, e.g., Gilbert Herdt, Preface, in THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER: BEYOND 
SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN CULTURE AND HISTORY 11 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1996) (de-
scribing how nonbinary identities have historically been recognized by many 
cultures, but that Western societies stigmatized these identities and persecuted 
nonbinary people). 
 94. For an overview of how laws in a variety of areas can include nonbinary 
identities, see Jessica Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2019). See also Monica Hesse, When No Gender Fits: A Quest to Be Seen 
as Just a Person, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/national/when-no-gender-fits-a-quest-to-be-seen-as-just-a-person/2014/ 
09/20/1ab21e6e-2c7b-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.html (describing efforts 
by nonbinary activists to have their gender identities recognized in an official 
capacity). 
 95. For more information on the Gender Recognition Act of 2017, see SB-
179 Gender Identity: Female, Male, or Nonbinary, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., https:// 
leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB179; 
see also Christina Caron, Californians Will Soon Have Nonbinary as a Gender 
Option on Birth Certificates, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/10/19/us/birth-certificate-nonbinary-gender-california.html (explain-
ing California’s new law allowing for a nonbinary gender option on birth certif-
icates). 
 96. See WASH. ADMIN CODE § 246-490-075 (2018); Sex Designation Change 
on a Birth Certificate, WASH. ST. DEP’T HEALTH, https://www.doh.wa.gov/ 
LicensesPermitsandCertificates/BirthDeathMarriageandDivorce/ 
SexDesignationChangeonaBirthCertificate (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
 97. See, e.g., NAT’L LGBT HEALTH EDUC. CTR., PROVIDING AFFIRMATIVE 
CARE FOR PATIENTS WITH NON-BINARY GENDER IDENTITIES 3; Hannah Mogul-
Adlin, Unanticipated: Healthcare Experiences of Gender Nonbinary Patients 
and Suggestions for Inclusive Care (Apr. 2015) (unpublished M.P.H. thesis, Yale 
University), http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1196&context=ysphtdl. 
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B. DEFINING SEX IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
Despite the advances in medical knowledge that have recog-
nized transgender, intersex, and nonbinary identities, courts 
have been slow to apply that knowledge in the field of antidis-
crimination law.98 This Section provides a brief overview of how 
Title VII and Title IX, federal laws that prohibit sex discrimina-
tion in employment and education, respectively, apply to sexual 
minorities. These laws are relevant to the ACA’s prohibition 
against sex discrimination because they use identical language 
to prohibit sex discrimination. 
1. Title VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimi-
nation by employers against employees “because of . . . sex.”99 
The statute does not define sex, but in the first twenty-five years 
of Title VII courts determined that the statute only prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of a person’s sex assigned at birth.100 
This interpretation of Title VII changed in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, in which the Supreme Court found that discrimination 
against an employee because she failed to adhere to gender ste-
reotypes constituted sex discrimination under Title VII.101 In 
Price Waterhouse, Price Waterhouse failed to promote a highly 
qualified employee, Ann Hopkins, because she was not effemi-
nate enough.102 To improve her chances of making partner, a 
partner suggested that she should “walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have 
her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”103 Because her employer 
failed to promote her because of its perception of her adherence 
 
 98. See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 100. See Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying 
Transgender Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GEN-
DER 423, 426 (2012) (citing Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 
456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff ’d, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978); Grossman v. Ber-
nards Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975), 
aff ’d mem., 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976)).  
 101. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“In forbid-
ding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (internal quotation omitted)).  
 102. Id. at 234–35. 
 103. Id. at 235. 
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to gender stereotypes, the Court held that Hopkins had success-
fully stated a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII.104 
Later courts have applied this theory of sex stereotyping to Title 
VII claims by transgender plaintiffs.105 Recently, a small number 
of courts have reached the conclusion that transgender discrim-
ination is per se sex discrimination without relying on Price Wa-
terhouse.  
a. Discrimination Because of Sex Stereotyping 
Transgender plaintiffs have experienced mixed results 
when claiming Title VII protection from discrimination under a 
theory of sex stereotyping established by Price Waterhouse. 
Some federal courts have held that because transgender people 
fail to conform to sex stereotypes, employers who discriminate 
against transgender people do so because of sex.106 For example, 
the Sixth Circuit held that “Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’ encom-
passes both the biological differences between men and women, 
and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based on fail-
ure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.”107 Courts have 
also reached opposite conclusions, finding that a person’s status 
 
 104. Id. at 258. 
 105. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 106. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1314, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 
2011) (determining that discrimination against transgender individuals is sex 
discrimination due to the individuals’ gender nonconformity); Smith v. City of 
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that “[s]ex stereotyping based 
on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, 
irrespective of the cause of that behavior”); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 
2d 293, 303–06 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding no difference for the purpose of determin-
ing Title VII liability whether an employer withdrew an offer of employment 
“because it perceived [the applicant] to be an insufficiently masculine man, an 
in sufficiently feminine woman, or an inherently gender-nonconforming trans-
sexual”); see also Levasseur, supra note 38, at 974–77 (collecting cases where 
Title VII was held to apply to transgender plaintiffs). Lee, supra note 100, de-
scribes three types of theories courts have used to apply Title VII to transgender 
discrimination: (1) the Gender Nonconformity Approach, (2) the Per Se Ap-
proaches, and (3) the Constructionist Approach. Id. at 427. The Gender Noncon-
formity Approach finds that a plaintiff ’s transgender status is irrelevant to the 
claim as long as the adverse employment action occurred because of the plain-
tiff ’s perceived gender nonconformity. Id. (citing Smith, 378 F.3d at 572–73). 
The Per Se Approaches hold that the language of Title VII inherently protects 
transgender plaintiffs. Id. (citing Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306–07). The Con-
structionist Approach sees both sex and gender as social constructs and deter-
mines that gender identity merits protection under Title VII. Id. (citing Ulane 
v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742 F.2d 1081 
(7th Cir. 1984)). 
 107. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 572 
(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Smith, 378 F.3d at 573). 
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as transgender does not offer protection under Title VII.108 Sex 
stereotyping theory tends to be less successful when an employer 
discriminates solely on the basis of the employee’s transgender 
status.109 
Although the sex stereotyping theory can offer transgender 
plaintiffs an opportunity to win employment discrimination 
cases, it requires them to argue that they have failed to conform 
to their biological sex as assigned at birth.110 As Diane Schroer, 
a transgender litigant in an employment discrimination case 
said, “I haven’t gone through all this only to have a court vindi-
cate my rights as a gender non-conforming man.”111 The attorney 
on this case noted that by pursuing the sex stereotyping strat-
egy, “[i]t felt as though we would be disavowing Ms. Schroer’s 
identity as a woman, and accepting society’s discriminatory con-
ception that transgender women are just men who want to dress 
as women.”112 This approach requires plaintiffs to introduce evi-
dence of their sex assigned at birth and assume that it is their 
“true” biological sex.113 Additionally, if a plaintiff pursues this 
theory and alleges information about their sex and gender, the 
defendant, and the court, may want to investigate those claims 
by subjecting them to medical examinations.114 
b. Discrimination Because of Transgender Identity 
The Sixth Circuit has held that discrimination on the basis 
of a person’s transgender status violates Title VII because “it is 
analytically impossible to fire an employee based on that em-
ployee’s status as a transgender person without being motivated, 
 
 108. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218–20, 1227 
(10th Cir. 2007) (siding with an employer who did not wish to accommodate a 
transgender employee’s need to use a restroom matching her gender); Goins v. 
W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 723–25 (Minn. 2011) (determining that the employer 
reasonably enforced a “cultural preference for restroom designation based on 
biological gender”); see also Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 
N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (dismissing a New York City Human 
Rights Law claim against a landlord who refused to renew a lease because of 
transgender people using the restroom). 
 109. See Levasseur, supra note 38, at 975–76 (explaining that courts have 
generally been less willing to apply sex stereotyping theory to discriminatory 
employment actions that are based solely on the plaintiff ’s gender transition). 
 110. See Sharon M. McGowan, Working with Clients to Develop Compatible 
Visions of What It Means to “Win” a Case: Reflections on Schroer v. Billington, 
45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 205, 212 (2010). 
 111. Id. at 205. 
 112. Id. at 212. 
 113. See id. at 214–15. 
 114. See id. at 216–17. 
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at least in part, by the employee’s sex.”115 In EEOC v. R.G. & 
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., Harris Funeral Homes fired 
Aimee Stephens because she “was no longer going to represent 
[her]self as a man [and] wanted to dress as a woman.”116 Apply-
ing an approach used by the Seventh Circuit in a sexual orienta-
tion discrimination case, the court isolated the significance of 
Ms. Stephens’s sex to the employer’s termination decision.117 It 
found that if Stephens had been a cisgender woman “who sought 
to comply with the women’s dress code,” Harris Funeral Homes 
would not have fired her.118 This fact, the court concluded, “con-
firms that Stephens’s sex impermissibly affected [her manager’s] 
decision to fire Stephens.”119 Under the Sixth Circuit’s approach, 
a transgender plaintiff who was fired because of their 
transgender identity would not need to rely on sex stereotyping 
theory to receive the legal protection of Title VII. This approach 
does not require transgender plaintiffs to introduce evidence 
about their “true” biological sex, which is a central problem of 
arguing under the sex stereotyping theory.120 
The Sixth Circuit raised a second rationale for its decision 
in Harris Funeral Homes by finding that discrimination on the 
basis of sex “inherently includes discrimination against employ-
ees because of a change in their sex.”121 It analogized sex under 
Title VII to religion122: an employer who fires an employee for 
converting from one religion to another clearly discriminates on 
the basis of religion.123 Similarly, because Harris Funeral Homes 
fired Stephens because of her desire to change her sex, it violated 
 
 115. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 575 
(6th Cir. 2018). The court also followed circuit precedent and held that employ-
ment discrimination against transgender people is also actionable under a sex 
stereotyping theory. Id. at 572 (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 
(6th Cir. 2004)). 
 116. Id. at 576. 
 117. Id. at 575 (citing Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 
345 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.  
 121. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 575 (citing Sue Landsittel, Com-
ment, Strange Bedfellows? Sex, Religion, and Transgender Identity Under Title 
VII, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1147, 1172 (2010) (arguing that sex under Title VII 
should be analogized to religion)). 
 122. Id. at 575–76. 
 123. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306–307 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(comparing a change in religion to a change in sex to demonstrate how the stat-
utory language of Title VII protects transgender individuals from discrimina-
tion). 
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Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination.124 The court 
disregarded Harris Funeral Homes’ argument that unlike reli-
gion, sex is a biologically immutable trait.125 It chose not to de-
cide that issue and instead simply pointed out that Title VII re-
quires sex and gender to be irrelevant to employment 
decisions.126 
2. Title IX 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of sex in educational institutions that 
receive federal funds.127 Although Title IX applies in education, 
not employment, courts often look to case law interpreting Title 
VII for guidance when interpreting Title IX.128 In 2014, the U.S. 
Department of Education directed recipients of federal financial 
assistance to treat transgender students consistently with their 
gender identity.129 However, not all schools followed that di-
rective. Gavin Grimm,130 a transgender student, sued his school 
for violating Title IX when it prohibited him from using a school 
bathroom consistent with his gender identity.131 The Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Grimm’s claim, 
finding that Title IX protects transgender students from sex-
based discrimination.132 
 
 124. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 575. 
 125. Id. at 576. 
 126. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (Bren-
nan, J., plurality opinion) (“[G]ender must be irrelevant to employment deci-
sions.”)). 
 127. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012). 
 128. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 865 n.4 
(8th Cir. 2011); Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811 (2003). 
 129. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS IN TITLE IX AND SINGLE SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY CLASSES 
AND EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES 25 (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/docs/faqs-title-ix-single-sex-201412.pdf. 
 130. Although Mr. Grimm’s name is confidential in the lawsuit because he 
was a minor when the litigation began, he has since become a public figure and 
transgender rights advocate. See Gavin Grimm (@GavinGrimmVA), FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/GavinGrimmVA/about/?ref=page_internal (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
 131. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 714–15, 
723 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017), remanded 
869 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (directing the lower court to consider whether the 
case is moot because the student graduated high school).  
 132. Id. at 723. 
  
486 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:467 
 
The Fourth Circuit reached its holding in G.G. ex rel. Grimm 
because of guidance issued by the Department of Education.133 
The Department of Education guidance clarified an ambiguity in 
federal education regulations, so the Fourth Circuit considered 
whether the guidance deserved deference under the Auer doc-
trine.134 This administrative law doctrine requires courts to en-
gage in a two-step process to determine whether an agency’s in-
terpretation of its own regulation is permissible.135 First, a court 
must determine whether the regulation is ambiguous.136 Second, 
if the regulation is ambiguous, the court will give controlling 
weight to the agency’s interpretation unless the interpretation 
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or stat-
ute.137 
Applying Auer, the Grimm court first considered whether 
the definition of “sex” in the regulation was ambiguous.138 It 
found that although the regulation clearly considers sex to be 
binary, consisting only of male and female, sex is a sum of many 
different “morphological, physiological, and behavioral peculiar-
ities.”139 Therefore, the definition of sex was ambiguous with re-
gard to transgender students.140 The court deferred to the 
Agency’s judgment, finding in the regulation a reasonable basis 
for protecting transgender students from discrimination under 
Title IX.141 After the Trump administration revoked this guid-
ance letter, the case was remanded for reconsideration by the 
district court.142 
On remand, the district court denied the school board’s mo-
tion to dismiss and found that Grimm pleaded a claim for sex 
discrimination under Title IX.143 Citing medical authority, the 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 719. 
 135. This deference is generally known as either Auer or Seminole Rock def-
erence. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 136. Auer, 519 U.S. at 457 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (noting that Congress had not “directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue”)). 
 137. Id. at 461. 
 138. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 719. 
 139. Id. at 721–22 (quoting Sex, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2081 (1971)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 740 (E.D. Va. 
2018). 
 143. Id. at 735. 
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court found that the school board policy that prevented Grimm 
from using the appropriate restroom made inaccurate assump-
tions about biological sex.144 The board had assumed that biolog-
ical sex is an inherent physiological distinction that separates 
males and females based on their external genitalia.145 The court 
found that this policy created an unmanageable standard that 
disregarded students “who have had genital surgery, individuals 
whose genitals were injured in an accident, [and] those with in-
tersex traits.”146 According to the court, the board’s policy al-
lowed it “to isolate, distinguish, and subject to differential treat-
ment any student who deviated from what the Board viewed a 
male or female student should be, and from the physiological 
characteristics the Board believed that a male or female student 
should have.”147 By using medical authority to determine that 
Grimm had stated a claim for sex discrimination under Title IX, 
the court applied an analytical approach that revealed the inac-
curate assumptions inherent in transgender discrimination. 
In similar cases, the Third Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Seventh 
Circuit, and several federal district courts148 have ruled in favor 
of transgender students. The Third Circuit upheld a school policy 
that allowed students to use facilities that corresponded to their 
gender identity and found that this policy was consistent with 
Title IX.149 The Sixth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction 
that required a school district to treat a transgender girl like 
other female students.150 The Seventh Circuit granted a similar 
 
 144. Id. at 743 (citing Wylie C. Hembree et al., Endocrine Treatment of Gen-
der-Dysphoric/Gender-Incongruent Persons: An Endocrine Society Clinical 
Practice Guideline, 102 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3869, 
3875 (2017)). 
 145. Id. at 742–43. 
 146. Id. at 742. 
 147. Id. at 743. 
 148. See, e.g., Parents for Privacy v. Dall. Sch. Dist. No. 2, No. 3:17-cv-01813, 
2018 WL 3550267, at *23–26 (D. Or. July 24, 2018) (finding that a school policy 
that allowed transgender students to use facilities that corresponded to their 
gender identity did not violate Title IX). 
 149. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 536 (3d Cir. 
2018); see also Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed. App’x 492, 
492–93 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting employee’s Title VII, Title IX, and constitu-
tional claims); Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 
2002) (finding that an employee who expressed concern and disapproval that a 
transgender co-worker was using restrooms that corresponded to their gender 
identity could not state a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII). 
 150. Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 222 (6th Cir. 2016). This 
case is still active in the Southern District of Ohio. The United States, under 
President Trump, agreed to voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit, but the parents of 
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preliminary injunction, but the case settled in December 2017.151 
In M.A.B. v. Board of Education, a federal district court in Mar-
yland ruled in favor of a transgender student whose school pre-
vented him from using the boys’ locker room.152 Adopting the 
reasoning used in Title VII cases, the court held that 
transgender discrimination is per se sex discrimination under 
the sex stereotyping theory established by Price Waterhouse.153 
Applying this reasoning to a claim under Title IX, the court de-
nied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.154 
Similarly, in Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. 
Johns County, a Florida federal district court ruled, after a 
bench trial, that a school district had violated Title IX by denying 
a transgender student access to facilities that corresponded to 
his gender identity.155 At trial, the court considered testimony 
from a developmental and clinical psychologist who explained 
how a person’s gender can be determined by many different char-
acteristics, including “external genitalia, internal sex organs, 
chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, fetal hormonal sex, hypothalamic 
sex, pubertal hormonal sex, neurological sex, and gender iden-
tity and role.”156 Additionally, the court considered an amicus 
brief filed by several leading medical organizations, including 
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Association 
of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American Medical As-
sociation.157 By relying on these scientific authorities, the court 
concluded that “the meaning of ‘sex’ in Title IX includes ‘gender 
 
the transgender student have intervened and are continuing to litigate the case. 
See Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist., Case No. 2:16-cv-524, 
2017 WL 3588727, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2017). 
 151. See Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. 
of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming a preliminary injunction 
requiring the school district to treat a transgender boy like other male stu-
dents); Joint Notice of Settlement, Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 
1 Bd. of Educ., No. 2:16-cv-00943-PP at 1 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 27, 2017).  
 152. M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 708 (D. Md. 
2018). 
 153. Id. at 713–14 (citing EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 
884 F.3d 560, 571–82 (6th Cir. 2018); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–
19 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 154. Id. at 717–18. (finding for the plaintiff additionally on an Equal Protec-
tion claim under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 155. Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., Case No. 3:17-cv-
739, 2018 WL 3583843, at *25 (M.D. Fla. July 26, 2018). 
 156. Id. at *2. 
 157. Id. at *2 n.14. 
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identity’ for the purposes of its application to transgender stu-
dents.”158 
The court’s approach in Adams ex rel. Kasper demonstrates 
how scientific and medical authorities can help courts better un-
derstanding how to interpret and apply antidiscrimination law. 
If these authorities are appropriate to consider in the context of 
education antidiscrimination law, as the next Section explains, 
they are even more relevant in healthcare antidiscrimination 
law. 
C. DEFINING SEX IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
The ACA incorporates its prohibitions on sex discrimination 
from Title IX and provides no specific definition of sex or gen-
der.159 It references sex in several provisions, including the sec-
tions establishing an Office of Women’s Health160 and mandat-
ing data collection to measure health disparities by sex.161 The 
nondiscrimination provision of the law, Pub. L. No. 111-148, Sec-
tion 1557 (2010), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (hereinafter Sec-
tion 1557), prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex by incor-
porating the protected grounds described in Title IX: 
[A]n individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under . . . title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) . . . be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of 
which is receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits, sub-
sidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or activity that 
is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established un-
der this title (or amendments).162 
The provision of Title IX cited in Section 1557 prohibits discrim-
ination “on the basis of sex,” but similarly, does not define what 
sex means.163 
1. HHS’s Interpretation of Section 1557 
In 2016, the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
(HHS) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) promulgated regulations in-
terpreting the nondiscrimination section of the ACA to protect 
transgender people by defining “on the basis of sex” to include 
 
 158. Id. at *23. 
 159. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) § 1557, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 160. See id. §§ 229, 310A, 713, 925, 1011. 
 161. See id. § 3101. 
 162. Id. § 1557. 
 163. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
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“gender identity.”164 OCR defined gender identity to mean: 
[A]n individual’s internal sense of gender, which may be male, female, 
neither, or a combination of male and female, and which may be differ-
ent from an individual’s sex assigned at birth. The way an individual 
expresses gender identity is frequently called gender expression, and 
may or may not conform to social stereotypes associated with a partic-
ular gender. A transgender individual is an individual whose gender 
identity is different from the sex assigned to that person at birth.165 
OCR justified including gender identity as a protected ground 
encompassed by the phrase “on the basis of sex” by citing inter-
pretations of sex discrimination by federal agencies166 and 
courts.167 Commenters suggested that OCR expressly include 
“gender expression” and “transgender status” in the definition of 
“on the basis of sex,” but OCR noted that it “encompass[es] these 
bases in the definition of ‘gender identity.’”168 Other commenters 
opined that HHS’s definition was contrary to “Congressional in-
tent to ban sex discrimination . . . based only on the biological 
classifications of males and females, not gender identity.”169 Re-
jecting this argument, OCR cited Price Waterhouse: “Courts after 
Price Waterhouse interpret Title VII’s protections against dis-
crimination on the basis of sex as encompassing not only ‘sex,’ or 
biological differences between the sexes, but also ‘gender’ and its 
manifestations.”170 
Although OCR found the ACA’s statutory definition of “on 
the basis of sex” to protect on the basis of gender identity, its 
reasoning demonstrates that it considers sex to refer to “biologi-
cal differences between the sexes.”171 The preamble distin-
guishes conceptually between gender identity and biological sex 
without defining the term sex. OCR’s description of sex is con-
trasted by its expansive view of gender identity, “which may be 
male, female, neither, or a combination of male and female.”172 
 
 164. 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 
31,376, 31,387 n.56 (May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92) (citing 
regulations, opinion letters, and statements by the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, Department of Labor, Department of Justice, and Department of Educa-
tion). 
 167. Id. at 31,387 n.58 (citing Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-
2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 WL 1197415 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) and cases inter-
preting Title VII).  
 168. Id. at 31,388. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016). 
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These regulations effectively prohibit any “health program or ac-
tivity”173 from discriminating against patients on the basis of 
gender identity, including transgender and nonbinary people. 
HHS is currently considering repealing these regulations, but 
has not yet done so.174 
2. Judicial Interpretations of Section 1557 
Few courts have considered whether Section 1557 applies to 
transgender plaintiffs.175 The two cases described in this Subsec-
tion capture two types of approaches taken by federal courts.176 
Although these decisions will likely become irrelevant if the 
 
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). 
 174. See Status Report at 1, Franciscan All., Inc. v. Azar, No. 7:16-cv-00108 
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018). 
 175. Legal scholars have argued for interpretations of Section 1557 that pro-
vide a cause of action for transgender plaintiffs, but these have yet to be taken 
up by any court. See Fore, supra note 38, at 244 (identifying legal theories under 
the ACA to protect transgender people from discrimination); Khan, supra note 
38, at 411 (arguing that securing health benefits for transgender people requires 
expanding the notion of what services are deemed medically necessary and, 
therefore, covered by health insurance). 
 176. Most federal courts that have considered the issue have found that ACA 
allows transgender plaintiffs to bring claims of sex discrimination. See, e.g., To-
var v. Essentia Health, Civil No. 16-100 (DWF/LIB), 2018 WL 4516949, at *7 
(D. Minn. Sept. 20, 2018) (finding that transgender plaintiff stated a claim for 
sex discrimination under the ACA); Boyden v. Conlin, No. 3:17-cv-264-wmc, 
2018 WL 4473347, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 18, 2018) (allowing transgender plain-
tiffs’ ACA sex discrimination claim to proceed to trial); Flack v. Wis. Dep’t of 
Health Servs., 18-cv-309-wmc, 2018 WL 3574875, at *15 (W.D. Wis. July 25, 
2018) (granting plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction against Wiscon-
sin because the state’s Medicaid ban on transgender-related procedures likely 
violates the ACA); Prescott v. Rady Children’s Hosp., 265 F. Supp. 1090, 1099–
1100 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss sex discrimination 
claims brought by a transgender plaintiff under the ACA); Rumble v. Fairview 
Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 WL 1197415, at *10 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 16, 2015) (same). A minority of courts have disagreed. See, e.g., Franciscan 
All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 670 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (finding that the 
ACA did not permit transgender plaintiff to bring a sex discrimination claim). 
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Trump administration repeals the existing regulations inter-
preting Section 1557,177 which it plans to do,178 they present two 
conflicting interpretations of sex in Section 1557. 
a. Franciscan Alliance v. Burwell 
On December 31, 2016, a federal court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction that blocked OCR’s definition of gender iden-
tity.179 Judge Reed O’Connor found that the regulation violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act by contradicting existing law 
and that the regulation likely violated the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.180 Franciscan Alliance, a privately-owned Cath-
olic healthcare provider, and the Christian Medical & Dental So-
ciety brought the action, claiming that the regulation inappro-
priately requires them to provide transition-related and 
abortion-related services.181 Eight states that have categorical 
exclusions for gender-transition procedures in their state health 
programs joined the suit.182 
 
 177. Transgender rights activists have expressed concerns that the Trump 
administration would repeal the regulations. See, e.g., Oxiris Barbot & Laura 
E. Durso, Promoting a Policy and Research Agenda to Protect Lesbian, Gay, Bi-
sexual, and Transgender Health in the New Political Era, 4 LGBT HEALTH 241, 
241 (2017); Gilbert Gonzales & Tara McKay, What an Emerging Trump Admin-
istration Means for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health, 1 HEALTH 
EQUITY 83, 83 (2017); William V. Padula & Kellan Baker, Coverage for Gender-
Affirming Care: Making Health Insurance Work for Transgender Americans, 4 
LGBT HEALTH 244, 245 (2017); Shefali Luthra, Transgender Healthcare Tar-
geted in Crusade to Undo ACA, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 13, 2017), https:// 
khn.org/news/transgender-health-care-targeted-in-crusade-to-undo-aca. These 
concerns appear to be well-founded because the administration has taken other 
notable anti-transgender actions. See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow, Federal Judge 
Says Trump Administration Can’t Stop Funding Sex-Reassignment Surgery for 
Military Members, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/local/public-safety/a-second-judge-blocks-trump-administrations-proposed 
-transgender-military-ban/2017/11/21/d91f65e4-cee1-11e7-81bc-c55a220c8cbe_ 
story.html. 
 178. Status Report at 1, Franciscan All., Inc., v. Price, No. 7:16-cv-00108 
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2017) (stating that HHS is revisiting the regulation and is 
in the process of drafting a proposed rule to change the existing regulation). If 
the Trump administration decides to rescind the existing regulations, that de-
cision will quite likely be subject to legal challenge. The 2016 regulations went 
through a full notice and comment process, so HHS will need to adequately ex-
plain why it has completely reversed course a year later. 
 179. See Franciscan All., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 670. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 672–75. 
 182. Arizona, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Texas, 
and Wisconsin are plaintiffs in this action. Id. at 670 n.3. 
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Analyzing Section 1557 under Chevron, the court deter-
mined whether the HHS regulations were entitled to defer-
ence.183 Chevron requires courts to defer to agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous statutes through a two-step analysis.184 First, 
courts must determine whether the statute in question is 
clear.185 If the statute is unambiguous, the court must enforce 
the statute’s plain meaning.186 If the statute is ambiguous, the 
court proceeds to step two and defers to the administrative 
agency’s interpretation of the statute if it is permissible.187 At 
Chevron step one, the Franciscan Alliance court focused on the 
differences between sex and gender to determine that Congress 
unambiguously meant to prohibit discrimination only on the ba-
sis of biological sex.188 The court relied on its own Title IX prec-
edent to conclude that “the meaning of sex in Title IX unambig-
uously refers to the biological and anatomical differences 
between male and female students as determined at their 
birth.”189 It also found that the text of Title IX supports a binary 
understanding of sex because Title IX contains language refer-
ring to “students of one sex,” “both sexes,” and “students of the 
other sex.”190 
Turning to the intent of Congress, the court noted that when 
Title IX was enacted “the term ‘sex’ was commonly understood 
to refer to the biological differences between males and fe-
males.”191 It supported this reading of Congressional intent by 
pointing out the origins of the term “gender identity” as a concept 
distinct from biological sex.192 It quoted transgender activist Vir-
ginia Prince, who coined the term transgender, as stating “I, at 
 
 183. Id. at 685. 
 184. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Franciscan All., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 685–87. 
 189. Id. at 687 (internal quotation omitted). 
 190. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C § 1681). 
 191. Id. at 688 (citing Sex, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (1976); Sex, 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971); Sex, OXFORD ENG-
LISH DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1961)). Contrary to the court’s assertion, only one of 
the three dictionaries cited by the court actually includes a binary definition of 
sex. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1961) (“The sum of those differ-
ences in the structure and function of the reproductive organs on the ground of 
which beings are distinguished as male and female, and of the other physiolog-
ical differences consequent on these.”). 
 192. Id. 
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least, know the difference between sex and gender.”193 It con-
cluded that Title IX prohibited sex discrimination “on the basis 
of the biological differences between males and females.”194 The 
court’s logic here relied on two points: sex means biological sex, 
and biological sex is exclusively determined by assignment at 
birth. Sex discrimination under Title IX, and therefore the ACA, 
cannot protect people from discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity because Congress understood that gender identity and 
sex are different. To illustrate this point, the court points to two 
other federal statutes that explicitly refer to gender identity: the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act and the 2013 amendments to the Violence Against Women 
Act.195 The Hate Crimes Prevention Act criminalizes violence 
motivated by “gender identity,”196 while the Violence Against 
Women Act amendments updated the statute to address both sex 
and gender identity.197 
The Justice Department, defending the regulation, relied on 
the stereotyping theory of sex discrimination established under 
Title VII in Price Waterhouse, arguing that discrimination on the 
basis of sex encompasses gender identity.198 OCR included this 
argument in the preamble to the final rule at issue.199 The Court 
distinguished Price Waterhouse by noting that the ACA only in-
corporated Title IX, not Title VII, and that even in the Price Wa-
terhouse decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged “the binary 
nature of sex.”200 
After Judge O’Connor issued a preliminary injunction 
against the regulation, the Justice Department, under the lead-
ership of a new Attorney General, requested that the Court re-
mand the case to HHS to allow the Agency to reconsider the final 
rule.201 The Court granted the request, staying the proceedings 
 
 193. Id. at 688 n.25 (citing Virginia Prince, Change of Sex or Gender, 10 
TRANSVESTIA 53, 60 (1969)). 
 194. Id. at 688. 
 195. Id. at 689. 
 196. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 197. 42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(13)(A) (2012). 
 198. Franciscan All., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 689 n.28. 
 199. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 
31,376, 31,387 (May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). 
 200. Franciscan All., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 689 n.28. 
 201. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-cv-00108-O, 2017 WL 3616652, 
at *3 (N.D. Tex July 10, 2017). 
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and remanding the issue to HHS so it could “reassess the rea-
sonableness, necessity, and efficacy” of the challenged aspects of 
the final rule.202 
b. Rumble v. Fairview Health Services 
Before OCR promulgated its regulations interpreting Sec-
tion 1557, a federal court agreed with its approach in Rumble v. 
Fairview Health Services, finding that the ACA protected 
transgender plaintiffs on a theory of sex stereotyping under Title 
IX.203 Denying a motion to dismiss, the court found that a 
transgender plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to allege an intent 
to discriminate because “the harassment was motivated by ei-
ther [the plaintiff’s] gender or failure to conform with gender ste-
reotypes.”204 In this case, the plaintiff experienced discrimina-
tion by hospital staff and an emergency room physician who 
conducted a painful and unnecessary examination of the plain-
tiff’s genitals.205 In addition, the plaintiff’s insurer initially de-
nied the claim for this hospital visit and the plaintiff received a 
bill stating: “THE DIAGNOSIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
PATIENT’S GENDER.”206 In light of the Franciscan Alliance de-
cision and the potential reconsideration of OCR’s regulation, the 
Rumble court stayed the litigation in January 2017 without re-
considering the merits of the case.207 The case settled in June 
2017.208 
The Rumble court’s reasoning provides a useful explanation 
of why courts should interpret Section 1557 as a freestanding 
healthcare antidiscrimination law, not merely as an application 
of other antidiscrimination laws to a new context. The court 
found that Section 1557 created “a new, health-specific, anti-dis-
crimination cause of action that is subject to a singular standard, 
regardless of a plaintiff’s protected class.”209 When determining 
what evidentiary and causation standards to apply to Rumble’s 
 
 202. Id. at *5. 
 203. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 
WL 1197415, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015). 
 204. Id. at *17 (quoting Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 
867 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 205. Id. at *16. 
 206. Id. at *18. 
 207. See Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2017 
WL 401940, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2017). 
 208. See Order Dismissing Case, Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-
cv-02037 (D. Minn. June 26, 2017). 
 209. See Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *11, *11 n.6. 
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case, the court noted that the various statutes incorporated by 
Section 1557 each have different enforcement mechanisms.210 If, 
for example, the court applied Title IX standards to sex discrim-
ination claims under Section 1557 but applied Title VI standards 
to a race claim, it would “lead to an illogical result.”211 If different 
standards applied, “then courts would have no guidance about 
what standard to apply for a Section 1557 plaintiff bringing an 
intersectional discrimination claim.”212 Intersectional claims 
arise when a plaintiff alleges discrimination because of at least 
two protected traits. Black women plaintiffs, for example, expe-
rience particular forms of discrimination because of the intersec-
tion of their race and gender.213 When interpreting Section 1557, 
courts can avoid these inconsistences by recognizing that the 
statute created a new healthcare-specific antidiscrimination 
cause of action. 
II.  INTERPRETING SEX DISCRIMINATION IN SECTION 
1557   
This Part considers how Section 1557’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination applies to transgender, intersex, and nonbinary 
people. By analyzing Section 1557’s definition of sex using tools 
of statutory interpretation, it provides a framework for courts to 
determine that Section 1557 unambiguously prohibits discrimi-
nation against sexual minorities. Following a traditional frame-
work of statutory interpretation, Section A begins with the stat-
ute’s text. It critiques the definition of sex proposed by the 
Franciscan Alliance court and reveals how its definition relies 
on assumptions about human sexuality instead of medical sci-
ence. It proposes a characteristics-based definition of sex that 
reflects the ordinary and scientific meanings of sex. Section B 
then explains how this definition is appropriate for the ACA’s 
healthcare context. Section C compares Section 1557 with other 
federal statutes that contain similar language and explains why 
Section 1557 may have a definition of sex independent of other 
federal civil rights laws. 
 
 210. Id. at *11. 
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. at *12. 
 213. Id. at *12 n.7 (citing Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1709, 1791 (1993)). 
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A. TEXT 
This Section critiques a common misunderstanding of sex 
discrimination as exemplified by the Franciscan Alliance court’s 
interpretation of the Section 1557. The Franciscan Alliance court 
defined sex by assignment at birth.214 Under this interpretation, 
sex can only be defined at birth and can never be changed. This 
misunderstanding relies on historical assumptions about biolog-
ical sex and fails to acknowledge contemporary medical sci-
ence.215 Because the Trump administration’s interpretation of 
Section 1557 will likely mirror the Franciscan Alliance court’s, 
this Section explains why the reasoning of Franciscan Alliance 
misinterprets the plain meaning of sex.216 Instead of defining sex 
exclusively by assignment at birth, this Section explains why 
Section 1557 defines sex by the variety of biological sex charac-
teristics detailed in Section I.A. 
1. Sex Defined by Assignment at Birth 
The Franciscan Alliance court held that sex in Section 1557 
unambiguously refers only to a person’s sex as assigned at 
 
 214. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 687 (N.D. Tex. 
2016). 
 215. For another example of this misunderstanding of sex, see Ryan T. An-
derson, A Brave New World of Transgender Policy, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
309 (2018). Anderson first critiques trans-inclusive policies as “prolonging gen-
der dysphoria,” and argues that such policies are merely trying to “indoctrinate 
our nation’s children.” Id. at 318. He cites a supposed medical expert who says 
that most children with gender dysphoria “will revert back to a gender identity 
consistent with their sex.” Id. at 319. Embracing the idea of diverse gender iden-
tities as disorders, he concludes that differentiating people based on biological 
sex is not discrimination, but reasonable and sound policy. Id. at 350. Unlike 
racial discrimination, he argues, gender identity discrimination is not harmful 
at all. Id. at 346–47. Undergirding his arguments is the assumption that biolog-
ical sex is an immutable truth that can be determined by a physician at birth. 
However, as contemporary medical science demonstrates, humans have a vari-
ety of sex characteristics that may or may not align with an exclusively male or 
female biological sex. His scathing criticism of transgender rights ignores the 
reality that transgender people who have their gender identity affirmed gener-
ally lead happier, healthier, and more productive lives than those who have 
their identities denied. See supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. 
 216. At the time of this Note’s submission, HHS has not yet released its pro-
posed rule interpreting Section 1557, but HHS has hinted in court filings that 
it plans to codify the Franciscan Alliance interpretation of sex in its proposed 
rule. See Status Update at 1–2, Franciscan All., Inc. v. Azar, No. 7:16-cv-00108 
(N.D. Tex Feb. 13, 2018); Status Update at 1–2, Franciscan All., Inc. v. Price, 
No. 7:16-cv-00108 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2017). 
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birth.217 Because Title IX was enacted in 1972, the court consid-
ers the ordinary meaning of sex at the time the statute was en-
acted.218 However, the court reaches an inappropriate definition 
of sex for the ACA for two reasons. First, courts should look to 
the enactment date of the ACA, not Title IX, to determine the 
ordinary meaning of sex at the time of the statute’s enactment. 
Second, even if the court appropriately considered these defini-
tions, it did not adhere to those definitions by assuming that bi-
ological sex is accurately defined at birth. 
As a general principle of statutory interpretation, courts at-
tempting to define a term in the statute look to the ordinary 
meaning of the term at the time Congress passed the statute.219 
However, in Section 1557, this principle needs to be applied 
somewhat differently because the statute incorporates defini-
tions from four other statutes enacted at different times. None 
of the cases cited in Franciscan Alliance apply this principle to 
statutes that incorporate language from different statutes.220 To 
apply this principle to Section 1557, the court would need to look 
to definitions from 1964, 1972, 1973, and 1975 because the stat-
ute incorporates definitions from four other laws.221 If courts 
must look to the definition from the time these other statutes 
were enacted or later amended, a court would need to use several 
dictionaries with potentially conflicting definitions.222 Instead, 
 
 217. Franciscan All., 227 F. Supp. 3d at 687. 
 218. Id. at 687–88 (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 388 (2009); MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994); Baker Botts 
L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2165 n.2 (2015)). 
 219. See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–68 
(2012) (looking to dictionary definitions of interpreter from 1978, when the word 
was added to the statute in question); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388 (looking to def-
initions of now from 1934, when Congress enacted the statute in question); see 
also Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 
YALE L.J. 788, 824–26 (2018) (noting that at least a few courts look to the ordi-
nary meaning of the time of the statute’s enactment). 
 220. See Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2165 n.2 (interpreting terms added to the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1934, 11 U.S.C. § 327(a)); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388 (inter-
preting terms contained in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 465, 479); MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 228 (interpreting terms con-
tained in the Communications Act of 1934, 27 U.S.C. § 203). 
 221. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012) (incorporating Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-4a; Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88; the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 6101–07; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. § 794). 
 222. Cf. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 
WL 1197415, at *11–12 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (noting that applying different 
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the court should simply look to the ordinary meaning of sex at 
the time the ACA was adopted in 2011. 
Even if the Franciscan Alliance court correctly looked to def-
initions of sex from 1972, it incorrectly assumes that sex is accu-
rately defined at birth. Each dictionary defines sex as a classifi-
cation based on an organism’s reproductive functions.223 None of 
these dictionaries define sex as biological differences determined 
at birth, the court’s own definition.224 No dictionary definition 
from 1972 supports the conclusion that biological sex is deter-
mined exclusively at birth. 
The only authorities the court cites for its definition of sex 
are two district court opinions.225 One of those opinions was writ-
ten by the Judge O’Connor a few months prior to his decision in 
Franciscan Alliance.226 The other, a decision from the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, claims that “[m]any courts have de-
fined the term ‘sex’ . . . as the biological sex assigned to a person 
at birth.”227 
However, this court only cited language from a single opin-
ion, the Supreme Court’s Frontiero v. Richardson, to support this 
proposition. In Frontiero, the Court wrote that “sex, like race and 
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely 
by the accident of birth.”228 Of course, the phrase “the accident 
of birth”229 does not endorse the idea that sex is accurately de-
termined at birth. Read in context, it merely gives one reason 
why sex discrimination is unjust.230 
Given the reality of how physicians assign sex at birth in the 
United States, there is no good reason for sex assignment at 
birth to be given any legal weight. Sex assignment at birth often 
 
legal standards to each cause of action under Section 1557 would create conflict-
ing results). 
 223. See Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 688 n.24 (N.D. 
Tex. 2016) (citing Sex, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (1976); Sex, WEB-
STER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971); Sex, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1961)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 687 (citing Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 833 (N.D. 
Tex. 2016); Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2015)). 
 226. See Texas, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 833. 
 227. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 670. 
 228. 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 686–87 (“[S]tatutory distinctions between the sexes often have 
the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class . . . to inferior legal status.”). 
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ignores complexities in an infant’s genetic, gonadal, morpholog-
ical, and psychological characteristics.231 Sex is typically deter-
mined at birth based solely on the size of an infant’s genitalia.232 
The experiences of intersex, nonbinary, and transgender people 
who often spend decades attempting to correct an inappropriate 
sex determination made at birth demonstrate how arbitrary 
birth sex assignment is.233 
In addition to giving undue weight to sex determinations 
made at birth, the Franciscan Alliance definition of sex leads to 
an absurd result by making it impossible for transgender, inter-
sex, or nonbinary people to be discriminated against on the basis 
of sex. If sex only refers to a person’s sex as assigned at birth, 
then transgender men who were assigned as “female” at birth 
are in fact “women” for the purposes of the statute. In that case, 
how could a physician discriminate against a transgender 
man?234 
To understand the absurdity of the Franciscan Alliance def-
inition of sex discrimination, consider applying it to the case of 
Jakob Rumble, the transgender man who sued his healthcare 
provider for sex discrimination under Section 1557.235 After ar-
riving at a hospital emergency department and presenting with 
a 104 degree fever, a physician treated Mr. Rumble in a hostile 
and aggressive manner, made anti-trans comments, and sub-
jected him to a painful and unnecessary genital exam.236 After 
being admitted to the hospital, another physician examined Mr. 
Rumble’s genitals and proceeded to use the same glove when ex-
amining his eyes and mouth, which caused sores to develop on 
 
 231. See supra notes 38–46 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 46. 
 233. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 74, at 3–5. Davis tells her personal story 
about how she received a sex assignment at birth that did not adequately reflect 
her intersex characteristics. Her medical providers had lied to her and her par-
ents for years until she discovered the truth at age nineteen. 
 234. The Franciscan Alliance court would likely argue that sex discrimina-
tion is discrimination “against women because they are women and against men 
because they are men.” Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 
1984) (holding that a transgender person was not protected by Title VII). But 
see Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (criticizing the statement about sex discrimination being discrimination 
“against women because they are women and against men because they are 
men” as an unhelpful truism). 
 235. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 
WL 1197415, at *1–7 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015). 
 236. Id. at *4. 
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his face.237 In these scenarios, both physicians treated Mr. Rum-
ble differently than they would treat cisgender patients and they 
treated him negatively because he was transgender. The only 
way this treatment could be considered sex discrimination under 
the Franciscan Alliance definition would be if they treated him 
in this manner because he was “female.” But, of course, the phy-
sicians did not mistreat Mr. Rumble because he was female—
they did so because he was a transgender male. 
The Franciscan Alliance interpretation of sex discrimina-
tion does not fit within the structure of Section 1557 because it 
precludes an entire class of people from being discriminated 
against on the basis of sex. Section 1557 prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of race, sex, age, and disability by incorporating pro-
tected classes from other antidiscrimination laws.238 Although 
disability discrimination is limited to people who meet the defi-
nition described in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,239 none of the 
other forms of discrimination prohibited by Section 1557 exclude 
a class of people. Race discrimination, as defined in Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act,240 and age discrimination, as defined in the 
Age Discrimination Act of 1975241 prohibit discrimination 
against people of all ages and races. Notably, Congress chose to 
incorporate the Age Discrimination Act and not the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act, which only prohibits discrimination 
against people over the age of forty.242 This suggests that Con-
gress sought to protect people of all ages from discrimination. 
Why would Congress then choose not to protect people of all 
sexes? The Franciscan Alliance interpretation of Section 1557 
would only prohibit sex-based discrimination against cisgender 
people, but protect everyone from racial and age-based discrimi-
nation.243 
Similarly, other areas of antidiscrimination law prohibit dis-
crimination against anyone on the basis of protected character-
istics. For example, Title VII protects everyone from race dis-
crimination because everyone has a race.244 Although anti-white 
 
 237. Id. at *6. 
 238. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). 
 239. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2016). 
 240. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
 241. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2012). 
 242. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 
U.S. 581, 584 (2004) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
only prohibits discrimination against older employees). 
 243. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). 
 244. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976). 
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discrimination was not Congress’s primary concern when it 
passed Title VII, the Supreme Court has made clear that Title 
VII applies to everyone regardless of race.245 Similarly, Title 
VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of religion 
protects the religious and non-religious alike.246 So too should 
sex discrimination in the ACA be interpreted to protect both cis-
gender and non-cisgender people. 
The Franciscan Alliance definition of sex discrimination 
leads to absurd results because, in contrast with antidiscrimina-
tion law generally and the rest of Section 1557, it permits sex-
based discrimination against an entire class of people. Even if a 
court were to determine that the ACA unambiguously defines 
sex as assigned at birth, the absurdity doctrine should prevent a 
court from reaching the Franciscan Alliance definition of sex. 
The absurdity doctrine is applied when a clear statutory mean-
ing would produce otherwise absurd results.247 Here, the Fran-
ciscan Alliance definition of sex would make it impossible for an 
entire group to be discriminated against on the basis of sex. That 
result runs contrary to nearly all other areas of anti-discrimina-
tion law. 
2. Sex Defined by Characteristics 
The ordinary meaning of sex in Section 1557 does not refer 
to sex assigned at birth, but to the many physiological and psy-
chological characteristics that determine sex. Contemporary dic-
tionaries define sex as the classification of a species, usually be-
tween men and women, based on reproductive organs or 
 
 245. Id. at 289. 
 246. See Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1989) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects the irreligious as well as those who practice religion)). 
 247. See Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190–91 (1991); United 
States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940); John F. Manning, The 
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388–89 (2003). 
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function.248 Similarly, a basic medical definition of sex is “biolog-
ical qualities that distinguish between male and female.”249 
These biological qualities include a person’s chromosomal, gon-
adal, morphological, and hormonal characteristics.250 In addition 
to these physiological factors is a person’s internal sense of 
sex,251 also referred to as gender identity or “brain sex.” Each of 
these factors contributes to a person’s sex. Sex discrimination 
under Section 1557 occurs when a person is discriminated 
against because of any one of these characteristics. 
This characteristics-based definition is flexible and may 
need to change as scientific understandings of sexual identities 
become more accurate. New characteristics may emerge as cen-
tral to an individual’s sex. For example, recent scientific studies 
have demonstrated that some of these characteristics, once 
thought of as binary, are far more complicated.252 Individual 
brains tend not to have a single sexual identity, and instead con-
tain an array of masculine and feminine traits, or what one neu-
roscientist describes as an “intersex brain” with a mosaic of char-
acteristics.253 Other legal protections for minorities have evolved 
 
 248. See, e.g., Sex, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www 
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sex (“[E]ither of the two major forms of indi-
viduals that occur in many species and that are distinguished respectively as 
female or male especially on the basis of their reproductive organs and struc-
tures.”); Sex, OED ONLINE (July 2018), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/176989 
(defined as “[e]ither of the two main categories (male and female) into which 
humans and many other living things are divided on the basis of their repro-
ductive functions” and “[i]n extended use, esp[ecially] as the third sex” in refer-
ring to a “(notional) third division of humanity regarded as analogous to, or as 
falling between, the male and female sexes; spec[ifically] that consisting of: (a) 
eunuchs or transsexuals . . . .”); see also supra note 223 and accompanying text.  
 249. See Claude J. Migeon & Amy B. Wisniewski, Sexual Differentiation: 
From Genes to Gender, 50 HORMONE RES. 245, 245 (1998) (describing how a 
variety of sex characteristics determine a person’s sex). 
 250. Id.; see supra Part 1.A. 
 251. See Greenberg 2006, supra note 39, at 54; Migeon & Wisniewski, supra 
note 249, at 249; Kenneth J. Zucker, Intersexuality and Gender Identity Differ-
entiation, 15 J. PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 3, 4 (2002). 
 252. See Cordelia Fine et al., Plasticity, Plasticity, Plasticity . . . and the 
Rigid Problem of Sex, 17 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 550, 550 (2013) (describing 
studies that demonstrate that maleness or femaleness is not “hardwired” in the 
human brain). 
 253. One study of human brains demonstrated that brains are far from sex-
ually dimorphic, and that most people have brain characteristics that are on a 
continuum between male and female. Daphna Joel, Genetic-Gonadal-Genitals 
Sex (3G-Sex) and the Misconception of Brain and Gender, or, Why 3G-Males and 
3G-Females Have Intersex Brain and Intersex Gender, 3 BIOLOGY SEX DIFFER-
ENCES 1, 2 (2012); see also Daphna Joel & Anne Fausto-Sterling, Beyond Sex 
Differences: New Approaches for Thinking About Variation in Brain Structure 
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over time to recognize the existence of more minority groups.254 
A characteristics-based interpretation of sex discrimination 
would do the same. 
A characteristics-based interpretation of sex discrimination 
also applies to everyone, not only cisgender people, and it reflects 
the realities of discrimination experienced by sexual minorities. 
For example, in the case of Mr. Rumble, his physicians treated 
him differently than other patients and caused him harm be-
cause they did not think that his gender identity aligned with 
the external appearance of his genitalia.255 If Mr. Rumble could 
prove that he was mistreated because of his sex identity as a 
transgender male, and the complaint suggests that he could,256 
his physician’s conduct would have been actionable under a char-
acteristics-based definition of sex.257 
B. CONTEXT 
A court could reach a characteristics-based definition sex 
simply by analyzing the statutory text and contemporary dic-
tionaries, but the overall context of the statute bolsters the plain 
meaning analysis described in Section II.A. A general principle 
 
and Function, 371 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1, 1 (2016) (“[H]uman 
brains are better described as belonging to a single heterogeneous population 
rather than two distinct populations.”). 
 254. Many laws in the United States that originally excluded minorities are 
now understood to recognize the dignity and humanity of those minorities. For 
example, women were once a minority excluded from the Constitution’s original 
notion of “people.” See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Part 
of the Constitution, 6 LAW & INEQ. 17, 17–18 (1988). In 1787, the Constitution 
did not apply to women. Id. Not until 1971 did the Supreme Court establish a 
jurisprudence that included women. Id. Similarly, gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
people have only recently been recognized by constitutional doctrine. Many 
states criminalized same-sex sexual behavior until the Supreme Court declared 
sodomy laws unconstitutional in 2003. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
558 (2003). The Court affirmed the dignity of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people 
in its landmark decision declaring a constitutional right to marriage. See Ober-
gefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). Transgender people have sim-
ilarly been ignored by the laws of the United States. As more Americans begin 
to recognize the existence and humanity of transgender people, it is imperative 
that courts consider how the laws of the United States apply to transgender 
people. As the Court wrote in Lawrence, “[a]s the Constitution endures, persons 
in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.” 539 U.S. at 579. 
 255. See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Compl. ¶¶ 39–60, Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., 14-cv-02037 
(D. Minn. June 20, 2014). 
 257. See Wong, supra note 38, at 500 (noting that denial of healthcare ser-
vices due to “failure to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or femi-
ninity” constitutes an actionable claim of discrimination). 
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of statutory interpretation requires courts to “read words in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme.”258 When interpreting the ACA, which comprehensively 
reformed the healthcare system in the United States, the overall 
scheme and purpose of the statute are especially important.259 
In the healthcare context, providers have a unique role in 
defining a person’s sexual identity. For a child born in a hospital 
in the United States, a physician defines the child’s sex based on 
the appearance of the child’s genitalia.260 Physicians also act as 
liaisons between a patient and healthcare services. Without phy-
sician approval, insurers will not agree to pay for a medical pro-
cedure, consultation, or medication.261 Many people enlist the 
help of healthcare providers when managing a sexually trans-
mitted disease, evaluating their fertility, and choosing a contra-
ception strategy. Section 1557’s definition of sex should reflect 
the unique role of healthcare providers in defining and manag-
ing their patients’ sex and sexuality. 
For transgender people, physicians are the gatekeepers to 
gender-affirmative care. For example, a transgender person 
seeking a hormone treatment must first find a physician willing 
to prescribe the treatment.262 To get their insurer to pay for the 
treatment, they need a physician to approve the treatment and 
certify that it is medically necessary, which often requires a di-
agnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID).263 Many transgender 
activists and scholars challenge the use of this diagnosis as a 
prerequisite for gender-affirming care because it negatively af-
fects people seeking affirmative care.264 These processes, how-
ever problematic, demonstrate how healthcare entities play a 
uniquely powerful role in the lives of transgender people. 
 
 258. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015). 
 259. See, e.g., id. at 2496 (“Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to im-
prove health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must 
interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the 
latter.”). 
 260. See FAUSTO-STERLING 2000, supra note 45, at 45–46. 
 261. See Kurzweil, supra note 36, at 217–19 (discussing the difficulties faced 
by transgender people in obtaining insurance coverage and approval). 
 262. Id. 
 263. See Silver, supra note 84, at 496; Romeo, supra note 83, at 724–25. 
 264. See, e.g., Spade, supra note 83, at 35 (“I do not want to make trans rights 
dependent upon GID diagnoses, because such diagnoses are not accessible to 
many low income people; because I believe that the diagnostic and treatment 
processes for GID are regulatory and promote a regime of coercive binary gen-
der; and because I believe that GID is still being misused by some mental health 
  
506 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:467 
 
A characteristics-based definition of sex makes sense in the 
medical context because physicians are in a unique position to 
determine a person’s sex characteristics.265 Healthcare providers 
can learn about any of these traits through medical examina-
tions and tests.266 In most other contexts, a person’s hormonal, 
gonadal, or morphological sex remain private. In healthcare, by 
contrast, physicians can learn about these factors before the pa-
tient herself. For example, intersex scholar and sociologist Geor-
giann Davis writes about how she did not learn that she had an 
intersex trait until over a decade after her physicians had dis-
covered it.267 Her physician had lied to her about her condition, 
telling her that she had a cancerous ovary that needed to be re-
moved.268 However, after she personally reviewed her medical 
records, she realized that she had simply had internal undevel-
oped internal testes, an intersex trait that was unlikely to cause 
any health problems.269 In Ms. Davis’s case, her physician 
learned about her intersex trait and made biased medical deci-
sions because of that trait. Her story demonstrates how physi-
cians have a unique opportunity to discriminate against sexual 
minorities because of their special knowledge of their patients’ 
sex characteristics. 
The special relationship that healthcare providers have with 
patients puts them in a uniquely powerful position to discrimi-
nate against patients on the basis of sex. Insurers also have ac-
 
practitioners as a basis for involuntary psychiatric treatment for gender trans-
gressive people.”); Jerry L. Dasti, Note, Advocating a Broader Understanding of 
the Necessity of Sex-Reassignment Surgery Under Medicaid, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1738, 1770 (2002) (“The main objection lodged by commentators against the 
‘medically necessary’ designation is that it tends to reinforce an erroneous clas-
sification system acknowledging only two sexes.”); Romeo, supra note 83, at 732 
(“Gender nonconforming people who do not articulate their experiences of gen-
der in a manner that comports with the diagnostic criteria for GID are often 
refused hormone treatments, surgeries, or other gender-related healthcare.”). 
 265. See Greenberg 2006, supra note 39, at 52 (noting that sex is typically 
determined by a newborn’s physician at birth). 
 266. For example, physicians can test the genetic make-up of a child. If a 
child’s sex is ambiguous, many will refuse to assign a sex until they receive the 
results of this genetic test. As one mother of a girl with an intersex syndrome 
reported, a physician told her: “Your baby is all female on the inside, but we 
have to wait for the chromosomal tests.” KARKAZIS, supra note 48, at 108. 
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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cess to this information because they can review a patient’s med-
ical record to make payment decisions.270 Unlike employers or 
educators, physicians and insurers can learn far more infor-
mation about an individual’s sex characteristics and use that in-
formation to discriminate. The unique context of healthcare sup-
ports a characteristics-based interpretation of sex in Section 
1557. This definition acknowledges the unequal power dynamic 
between providers and patients, and offers protections for sexual 
minorities who are subject to discrimination by their providers 
or insurers.  
C. SQUARING SECTION 1557 WITH OTHER FEDERAL LAWS 
This Section compares the Section 1557’s characteristics-
based definition of sex with the definitions of sex in other federal 
laws: Title IX, Title VII, the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, 
Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, and the Violence 
Against Women Act. This Note does not argue that these other 
statutes do not protect sexual minorities from discrimination. 
Rather, it considers how courts and advocates can analyze the 
meaning of sex in the ACA independently from those laws. The 
Rumble court determined that Section 1557 creates a new cause 
of action with its own evidentiary and causation standards.271 
This Section builds on that analysis by explaining why other fed-
eral laws do not preclude a characteristics-based definition of sex 
discrimination in Section 1557. 
1. Title VII and Title IX 
A characteristics-based definition of sex in Section 1557 
would not be precluded even if Title VII and Title IX are inter-
preted to contain a different definition of sex. Where Congress 
re-enacts a statute or incorporates a statute by reference, it only 
adopts settled judicial constructions where “the supposed judi-
cial consensus [is] so broad and unquestioned that we must pre-
sume Congress knew of and endorsed it.”272 Title IX’s applicabil-
ity to transgender people was far from settled at the time the 
ACA was enacted in 2010. Before 2015, no federal court had con-
sidered the issue directly in the Title IX context273 and courts 
 
 270. See, e.g., Kurzweil, supra note 36, at 261 (noting that insurers fre-
quently deny coverage for transition-related procedures). 
 271. See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text. 
 272. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf ’ t, 543 U.S. 335, 349 (2005). 
 273. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that Title IX “does not 
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interpreting Title VII had reached an array of different conclu-
sions.274 Since 2015, most courts have found that transgender 
plaintiffs can bring sex discrimination claims under Title IX.275 
The variety of judicial interpretations of the issue, and the lack 
of any Supreme Court decisions, demonstrate that Congress 
could not have adopted any particular judicial interpretation of 
Title IX in Section 1557. 
Given the uncertainty of how Title VII and Title IX treat 
transgender people, the principle of in pari materia alone does 
not resolve the question of how Section 1557 applies to sexual 
minorities. In pari materia is the principle of statutory interpre-
tation that similar statutory provisions found in comparable 
statutory schemes should be applied similarly.276 This presump-
tion of statutory consistency has the greatest force when the 
terms are used in “the same act.”277 Congress is less likely to use 
terms consistently across different acts, especially when it 
passed those acts in different decades.278 Title VII and Title IX 
were passed decades before the ACA at a time when the medical 
 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of transgender itself because transgender 
is not a protected characteristic”). 
 274. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(“Sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is im-
permissible discrimination.”); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 
(9th Cir. 2000); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 715 
(D. Md. 2018) (holding that “claims of discrimination on the basis of transgender 
status are per se actionable under a gender stereotyping theory”); see also 
Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 296–97 (W.D. Pa. 
2017) (collecting cases). 
 275. See, e.g., M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 715; Evancho, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 
296–97 (collecting cases); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 865 (S.D. Ohio 2016). But see Texas v. 
United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 832–33 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (interpreting the 
term “sex” under 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 and Title IX to mean “the biological and 
anatomical differences between male and female students as determined at 
their birth”). 
 276. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972). 
 277. See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007). 
 278. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 130 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(citing Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from 
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the 
Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 936 (2013)). 
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understanding of sex characteristics was more limited.279 Fur-
ther, neither Title VII nor Title IX address discrimination in the 
unique context of healthcare.280 
Just because an identical term is used in similar statutory 
provisions does not mean that the term must have an identical 
meaning in each statute. For example, a “coal mine,” as defined 
by two separate provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)–(2), has a different 
meaning depending on the context.281 When Congress amended 
the Act in 1977, it retained an earlier definition for the purpose 
of determining eligibility for black lung benefits.282 Despite sim-
ilar definitions, courts have interpreted those definitions to have 
unique, context-dependent meanings.283 The amended Act, at 
§ 802(h)(1), broadly defined a coal mine as including the mine 
itself and any facilities used in the extraction of minerals.284 By 
contrast, the black lung benefit mine definition, at § 802(h)(2), 
defines a mine more narrowly and restricts the definition of 
“mine” to areas geographically near the mining tunnels.285 Just 
as coal mines have independent, context-dependent definitions, 
so too might the term sex as used in Title VII, Title IX, and Sec-
tion 1557. 
Interpretations of Title VII and Title IX are not strong 
enough to override the plain meaning arguments, both textual 
and contextual, that support a characteristics-based definition of 
 
 279. See DAVIS, supra note 74, at 66–68 (describing the development of ter-
minology to refer to people with intersex traits); FAUSTO-STERLING 2000, supra 
note 45, at 45–48 (describing the history of medical knowledge of intersex char-
acteristics). 
 280. See supra Part II.B. 
 281. See 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (2012) (defining coal mines generally for the 
purposes of the Act); id. § 802(h)(2) (adopting a different definition of coal mine 
for the purpose of black lung benefits). 
 282. Black lung benefits provide “compensation to coal miners who are to-
tally disabled by pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment, and to 
survivors of coal miners whose deaths are attributable to the disease” and pro-
vide “eligible miners with medical coverage for the treatment of lung diseases 
related to pneumoconiosis.” Division of Coal Mine Workers’ Compensation 
(DCMWC), U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dcmwc (last visited Oct. 
12, 2018). 
 283. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Ziegler Coal Co., 853 F.2d 529, 534 (7th 
Cir. 1988); Herman v. Commonwealth Edison, No. 98-C-3308, 1999 WL 350644, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 1999); see also Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Is 
“Mine” Under Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C.A. 
§ 802(h)), 167 A.L.R. FED. 293 (2001). 
 284. 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1). 
 285. Id. § 802(h)(2). 
  
510 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:467 
 
sex in Section 1557. Given the unique context and structure of 
the ACA, a court may interpret the meaning of sex in Section 
1557 in a manner independent of Title VII and Title IX. 
2. Contemporaneous Statutes 
Around the time that Congress passed the ACA, it passed 
two statutes that differentiated sex and gender. The Matthew 
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act 
(HCPA) criminalizes willfully causing bodily injury to another 
person because of that person’s “actual or perceived . . . gender, 
sexual orientation, [or] gender identity.”286 It defines gender 
identity as “actual or perceived gender-related characteris-
tics.”287 Similarly, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization 
Act (VAWRA) was passed in 2013, adding “gender identity” as a 
protected characteristic in the statute’s nondiscrimination pro-
vision.288 The VAWRA amendment incorporated the definition of 
gender identity from the HCPA.289 
The court in Franciscan Alliance argued that these statutes 
demonstrate how Congress understood the difference between 
sex and gender, and by not specifying “gender identity” in Sec-
tion 1557, that it did not intend to prohibit discrimination on 
that basis.290 This interpretation could lead to strange results. 
For example, under the interpretation of the Franciscan Alliance 
court,291 a transgender person who was violently attacked for be-
ing transgender could then be turned away by the hospital where 
they sought treatment for their injuries.292 The attacker would 
be subject to prosecution under the HCPA, but the hospital could 
legally refuse treatment because it did not want to treat 
transgender patients. 
 
 286. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 287. Id. § 249(c)(4). 
 288. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-
4, § 3(b)(4), 127 Stat. 61 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 12291(b)(13)(A)). 
 289. 34 U.S.C. § 12291(b)(13)(A) (2017).  
 290. See supra Part I.C.2.a. 
 291. 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 689 (N.D. Tex 2016) (arguing that the HCPA indi-
cates that Congress did not intend to protect transgender people from discrimi-
nation in the ACA). 
 292. This hypothetical assumes that the patient is not seeking emergency 
care. Other federal law prohibits hospitals that receive federal funding from 
turning away patients in need of emergency care. See infra note 339 and accom-
panying text. 
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The differentiation of sex and gender identity in the HCPA, 
and as adopted in the VAWRA, does not mean that the two clas-
ses are separate categories in all other acts passed by Congress. 
Congress often uses “both a belt and suspenders to achieve its 
objectives.”293 Gender identity is a sex characteristic, and so dis-
crimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the 
basis of gender identity. Differentiating the two categories may 
simply be an example of duplicative language. Additionally, the 
HCPA and VAWRA are both criminal statutes. Under the rule 
of lenity, courts generally require that any ambiguities in a crim-
inal statute be resolved in favor of the defendant.294 Accordingly, 
statutory language in criminal statutes may be more specific 
than a similar civil statute to ensure there is no ambiguity. 
The relationship between sex and gender in Section 1557 is 
comparable to the relationship between national origin and eth-
nicity in Title VII.295 Although Title VII does not specify ethnic-
ity as a protected trait, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity 
is actionable as a claim of national origin discrimination.296 “[A]s 
a legal matter,” the terms overlap.297 At least one other federal 
statute differentiates those traits.298 That fact did not preclude 
the Supreme Court from interpreting Title VII’s definition of na-
tional origin as inclusive of ethnicity. Similarly, Section 1557’s 
 
 293. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1096 (2015) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (noting that redundant language in a federal maritime statute 
may reflect a “belt-and-suspenders caution”); United States v. Bronstein, 849 
F.3d 1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (analyzing a statute prohibiting the use of fire-
arms outside the Supreme Court, and noting the statute appears to use a belt-
and-suspenders approach, including terms that may be redundant); Hively v. 
Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (arguing that 
sex also includes sexual orientation, and that the inclusion of both phrases in 
the HCPA simply indicates that Congress used “both a belt and suspenders to 
achieve its objectives”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 176–77 (2012) (“Sometimes draft-
ers do repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of substance, 
either out of a flawed sense of style or to engage in the ill-conceived but lamen-
tably common belt-and-suspenders approach.”). 
 294. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia, J., plural-
ity) (describing the rule of lenity). 
 295. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 
579 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 296. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 605, 614 (1987) (Bren-
nan, J. concurring).  
 297. Id. 
 298. See Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 579 (citing 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1092(f ) (1)(F)(ii), which requires colleges that issue financial aid to report sta-
tistics about campus hate crimes). 
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definition of sex includes gender identity, even though Congress 
chose to differentiate the traits in other statutes.  
The different purposes of the HCPA and the ACA also ex-
plain the divergence in language when describing sex and gen-
der. The HCPA had a single goal: to protect minorities from hate 
crimes and provide recourse to victims of these crimes.299 By con-
trast, the ACA sought to reform the U.S. healthcare system, a 
notoriously complex and difficult task.300 The legislative history 
of the HCPA supports a reading of the statute that is focused on 
solving a single problem. The House Judiciary Committee’s re-
port on this legislation notes that transgender people have suf-
fered from particularly violent hate crimes, which are “the prod-
uct of extreme bias against gender nonconformity.”301 It also 
recognizes that local police “often lack training and familiarity 
with transgender people.”302 These findings suggest that Con-
gress wanted to especially protect transgender people from hate 
crimes. By specifying gender identity as a protected trait, Con-
gress did not suggest that sex and gender identity are separate 
concepts. Rather, it sought to ensure that the federal govern-
ment could punish perpetrators of anti-transgender hate crimes. 
The plain text and unique context of Section 1557 require an in-
terpretation of the statute that does not rely on these other civil 
rights laws. 
D. DEFERRING TO HHS’S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1557 
Because this Part reached a characteristics-based definition 
of sex discrimination using tools of statutory construction, a 
court could end its inquiry there and would not need to consider 
the purposes of the ACA. The arguments in this Part would allow 
a court to decide that Section 1557’s prohibition on sex discrimi-
nation unambiguously protects people with transgender, inter-
sex, and nonbinary identities. The question of whether sex dis-
crimination claims by transgender plaintiffs are cognizable 
under Section 1557 can be answered by using the statute itself—
no interpretation or regulatory deference is required. In fact, 
some federal district courts have agreed with this view, refusing 
to stay transgender plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claims against 
 
 299. See 18 U.S.C. § 249 note (2016) (Findings) (describing how violence mo-
tivated by the victim’s gender identity is a serious problem that Congress seeks 
to resolve with the statute). 
 300. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the purposes of the ACA. 
 301. H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 11 (2009). 
 302. Id. 
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their health insurers in light of the Franciscan Alliance deci-
sion.303 The court decided that it could address the statutory 
question even if the Obama-era regulations were enjoined.304 
However, HHS will likely issue regulations that contradict 
that unambiguous meaning.305 If those regulations are chal-
lenged, a court would analyze whether HHS exceeded its statu-
tory authority under Chevron.306 Chevron requires courts to use 
“traditional tools of statutory construction,” like those used in 
this Part, to ascertain whether “Congress had an intention on 
the precise question at issue.”307 Therefore, a court could decide 
against that interpretation at Chevron step one. Part III supple-
ments the statutory analysis that would be conducted at Chev-
ron step one by explaining how Section 1557 fits into the frame-
work of the ACA. 
III.  SEX DISCRIMINATION & THE ACA’S PURPOSE   
The Supreme Court has found that the ACA signals a clear 
statutory purpose and, when interpreting the statute, it has at-
tempted to further that purpose, even if the statutory text seems 
to contradict Congress’s objectives.308 If a court is not convinced 
that Section 1557’s definition of sex unambiguously applies to 
sexual minorities, under Supreme Court precedent, the purpose 
of the statute trumps any statutory ambiguity. This Part ex-
plains how a characteristics-based definition of sex is consistent 
with the ACA’s purpose. 
 
 303. See Tovar v. Essentia Health, Civil No. 16-100 (DWF/LIB), 2018 WL 
4516949, at *7 (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 2018) (finding that transgender plaintiffs 
stated a claim for sex discrimination under Section 1557 and declining to stay 
the case in light of Franciscan Alliance); Boyden v. Conlin, No. 3:17-cv-264-wmc, 
2018 WL 2191733, at *9 (W.D. Wis. May 11, 2018) (same). 
 304. Id. at 21. But see North Dakota v. Burwell, No. 3:16-cv-00386, at 2 
(D.N.D. Aug. 24, 2017) (granting defendant’s motion to stay the litigation until 
HHS issues new regulations interpreting Section 1557). 
 305. See supra note 216; Status Update at 1–2, Franciscan All., Inc. v. Azar, 
No. 7:16-cv-00108 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018) (noting that HHS is “reevaluating 
the reasonableness, necessity, and efficacy of [45 C.F.R. § 92]”). 
 306. Regulations promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking re-
ceive judicial deference under the Chevron standard. See United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31, 230 n.11 (2001) (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kris-
tin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001) (explaining 
how Chevron applies to situations where Congress would have intended a 
higher level of deference to agency interpretation, including when agencies 
promulgate regulations through notice-and-comment rulemaking)). 
 307. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
n.9 (1984). 
 308. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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The ACA expanded coverage and prohibited price discrimi-
nation by health insurers, except in limited circumstances.309 
Prior to the ACA, insurers would discriminate amongst their in-
sureds by charging higher premiums to patients who had a 
higher risk of using medical services.310 The law also sought to 
expand coverage and make health insurance more affordable.311 
Excluding sexual minorities from the law’s antidiscrimination 
provision runs counter to that purpose by restricting access to 
care. Section A provides a brief overview of the key goals of the 
ACA, and Section B explains how a characteristics-based defini-
tion of sex furthers those goals. 
A. PURPOSES OF THE ACA 
The purpose of the ACA is to expand healthcare coverage for 
all Americans and dramatically reduce the number of unin-
sured.312 Prior to the law’s passage, approximately fifty million 
people in the United States were uninsured, but these uninsured 
people consumed more than $100 billion in healthcare services 
annually.313 Because most uninsured could not afford care, they 
accumulated debts they could never pay.314 Healthcare providers 
did not absorb these debts, but passed them onto reliable payers: 
government and private insurance.315 Insurers in turn passed 
those costs onto their subscribers, while governments passed 
them on to taxpayers.316 Additionally, people without insurance 
lacked access to preventative care.317 Without access to preven-
tative care, diseases that could be treated easily, notably chronic 
conditions such as hypertension or diabetes, became worse over 
time for this population.318 When they did receive care, it re-
quired “costly and extensive intervention[s].”319 
 
 309. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2486 (2015). 
 310. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 596–97 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining how health 
insurers would discriminate against people with preexisting medical conditions 
by charging higher premiums or denying coverage). 
 311. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485 (“The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act adopts a series of interlocking reforms designed to expand coverage in the 
individual health insurance market.”). 
 312. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 596. 
 313. Id. at 592. 
 314. Id. at 593. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 594. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
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Congress’s solution to these problems in the individual 
health insurance market took a three-pronged approach. First, 
the ACA required insurers to issue policies to patients regardless 
of their health status or other demographic factors—the guaran-
teed issue requirement320—while also preventing insurers from 
charging higher premiums to certain populations.321 Together, 
these requirements limit how insurers may discriminate in issu-
ing policies or establishing insurance premiums.322 Second, the 
ACA requires individuals to maintain insurance coverage or pay 
a tax penalty to the federal government—the coverage man-
date.323 The mandate was necessary to increase the size of the 
insurance pool and ensure that healthy people, who seldom use 
healthcare services, paid insurance premiums.324 Including 
more healthy people in an insurance pool lowers premiums for 
all policy-holders.325 Third, the ACA grants tax credits and sub-
sides to make insurance premiums affordable for low-income 
people.326 To facilitate this new system of individual insurance, 
the ACA also required that states establish online health insur-
ance exchanges that would make shopping for insurance eas-
ier.327 If a state chose not to establish an exchange, the federal 
government would provide an exchange that individuals in that 
state could use instead.328 
The Supreme Court has held that each of these three re-
forms were necessary for the overall individual health insurance 
market to work as Congress intended.329 When the individual 
 
 320. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2486 
(2015). 
 321. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg; King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486. 
 322. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 597 (Ginsberg, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). The law allows insurers to discriminate when 
setting premiums in only limited ways. Premiums can be up to three times 
higher for older insureds than for younger insureds, tobacco users may be 
charged up to fifty percent more for premiums, and families can be charged 
more than individuals. Additionally, insurers can charge different premiums 
based on geographic areas. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(4). 
 323. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012); see also King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486. In 2017, 
Congress effectively repealed the individual mandate by reducing the tax pen-
alties owed by people without insurance to zero. See Pub. L. No. 115-97 
§ 11081(a), 131 Stat. 2032 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2018)). 
 324. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486–87. 
 325. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486–87. 
 326. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081–82; King, 
135 S. Ct. at 2487. 
 327. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487. 
 328. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487. 
 329. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493. 
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mandate was challenged as an unconstitutional exercise of Con-
gressional power, the Court found that it was constitutional be-
cause it functioned as a tax.330 In 2015, the tax credits and sub-
sidies were challenged.331 Petitioners in King v. Burwell argued 
that the tax credits were only available to people who had pur-
chased plans on individual insurance exchanges established by 
the states and not to individuals who purchased plans on the 
federal exchange.332 The text of the ACA specifies that the sub-
sides would only be available to individuals purchasing insur-
ance on “an Exchange established by the State.”333 
Despite the apparent plain meaning of this provision, the 
Court held that this reading was contrary to overall structure of 
the ACA.334 Looking at the whole context of the statute, the 
Court found that Congress could not have possibly intended to 
eliminate one of the three central pillars of insurance reform 
with this single provision: “Congress passed the Affordable Care 
Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy 
them.”335 The Court chose not to adhere strictly to the text of the 
statute because doing so would have created a result counter to 
ACA’s overall design.336 Additionally, the Court noted that the 
ACA “contains more than a few examples of inartful drafting” 
due to the legislative procedures used to write the law.337 
B. FURTHERING THE ACA’S PURPOSE BY PREVENTING SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 
Without Section 1557, providers could refuse to serve 
transgender, intersex, and nonbinary people. Physicians could 
refuse to provide routine preventative services simply because 
the patient is transgender. In fact, many transgender people re-
port such experiences.338 They can access care through emer-
gency services, because other federal law requires hospitals to 
accept all patients who need emergency care.339 However, the 
 
 330. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012). 
 331. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485. 
 332. Id. at 2483–84. 
 333. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f ) (3)(A); King, 135 S. Ct. at 
2487. 
 334. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495. 
 335. Id. at 2496. 
 336. Id. at 2495–96. 
 337. Id. at 2492. 
 338. See, e.g., 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 93–103 (describ-
ing transgender experiences in healthcare as reported by transgender people). 
 339. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 
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ACA sought to eliminate the need for people to only access med-
ical care on an emergency basis.340 Instead, it incentivized people 
to obtain preventative services by making insurers cover preven-
tative services without any cost-sharing.341 Allowing physicians 
to discriminate against sexual minorities prevents them from ob-
taining the types of services Congress sought to make available 
to all Americans. 
Allowing insurers to discriminate against transgender, in-
tersex, and nonbinary people would similarly run counter to the 
ACA’s overall design. Insurers are required to issue policies to 
sexual minorities and cannot charge them higher premiums.342 
But without Section 1557, insurers could deny claims for unique 
situations faced by only by sexual minorities. For example, a 
transgender man who has a uterus would need to receive routine 
procedures to screen for cervical cancer. His insurer could deny 
this claim because the patient is male and the procedure does 
not “match” his documented sex—which is precisely what hap-
pened to the plaintiff in Rumble.343 Additionally, insurers could 
have blanket exclusions for all gender-affirming services, includ-
ing surgeries and hormone treatments.344 
Both routine services and gender-affirming services are cru-
cial to the physical and mental health of transgender people.345 
If they cannot access these services because of a discriminatory 
insurer, the insurance plan they receive becomes less valuable 
to them. This reality runs counter to the ACA’s requirements 
that insurers cover preventative care. Further, the law requires 
insurers to provide essential health benefits because Congress 
 
U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012) (requiring all hospitals that operate emergency rooms 
and participate in Medicare to screen and stabilize any patients who arrive at 
the hospital suffering from emergency medical conditions). 
 340. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 656 n.2 (2012). 
 341. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (requiring private health plans to provide pre-
ventative care services without any cost-sharing). 
 342. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486. 
 343. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 
WL 1197415, at *18 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015). 
 344. See Padula & Baker, supra note 177, at 244 (describing how many in-
surers categorically deny transgender enrollees access to a variety of healthcare 
services). 
 345. See, e.g., 2015 TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 107 (discussing 
the psychological distress experienced by many transgender people); van de 
Grift et al., supra note 20, at 138–39. 
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wanted to ensure that health plans met basic quality require-
ments.346 Denying sexual minorities care prevents them from ac-
cessing preventative care and other categories of health services. 
Although allowing discrimination against sexual minorities 
would not drastically dismantle the ACA’s framework of reforms 
in the way the Supreme Court discussed in King v. Burwell, dis-
crimination against these groups undermines the central pur-
poses of the ACA. The Supreme Court has determined that the 
purposes of the ACA are highly relevant to determining the stat-
ute’s meaning. As the Supreme Court did in King v. Burwell, 
courts should protect the purposes of the ACA when an individ-
ual provision appears “untenable in light of the statute as 
whole.”347 
  CONCLUSION   
Transgender, intersex, and nonbinary people suffer from 
frequent discrimination by healthcare providers and insurers. 
An interpretation of the ACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination 
that accurately reflects contemporary medical science would pro-
hibit discrimination against sexual minorities. Sex discrimina-
tion in the ACA should be interpreted to prohibit discrimination 
based on any sex characteristic, including gender identity. This 
definition follows the ordinary meaning of biological sex and fits 
within the healthcare context, where providers and insurers 
have access to information about their patient’s sex characteris-
tics. It also advances the purposes of the statute and fits within 
the ACA’s framework of comprehensive health reform.  
Freedom from discrimination in healthcare is of particular 
importance for transgender people because many rely on gender-
affirming services to have their identities recognized by the state 
and the general public.348 Even if other areas of antidiscrimina-
tion law ignore the dignity of transgender, intersex, and nonbi-
nary people, the ACA provides an opportunity for these people 
to defend their right to receive healthcare without discrimina-
tion. Just as the Supreme Court has recognized the dignity of 
 
 346. The ACA requires insurers to provide coverage for certain types of ser-
vices including hospitalization, maternity care, laboratory services, prescrip-
tions drugs, and mental health treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1). 
 347. 135 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indust., Inc., 
510 U.S. 332, 343 (1994)). 
 348. Recall that some states still require transgender people to obtain spe-
cific services in order to have their sex identities recognized on official docu-
ments. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
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minorities in constitutional law,349 so too should courts recognize 
the dignity of sexual minorities in healthcare settings: “As the 
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its 
principles in their own search for greater freedom.”350 The ACA 
establishes principles and creates a statutory framework to do 
just that. 
 
 
 349. See supra note 254. 
 350. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 579 (2003). 
